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ABSTRACT
Intellectual property’s road to hell is paved with good intentions. Because
liability is difficult to predict, intellectual property users often seek licenses even
when proceeding without one might be permissible. Yet because the existence
(vel non) of licensing markets plays a key role in determining the breadth of
rights, these seemingly sensible licensing decisions eventually feed back into
doctrine; the licensing itself becomes proof that the entitlement covers the use.
Over time, then, public privilege recedes and rights expand, moving intellectual
property’s ubiquitous gray areas into what used to be virgin territoryCwhere
risk aversion again creates licensing markets, which cause further accretion of
entitlements, which in turn push the gray areas even farther afield, and so on.
This “doctrinal feedback” is not a result of changes in the positive law (the
scholarship’s usual focus), but is instead rooted in longstanding, widely
accepted doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of everyone involved.
Because feedback is so ingrained in established law and practice, its various
cures tend to create more problems than they solve. There exists, however, one
promising solutionCsubtle changes in doctrine’s use of licensing
informationCthat can keep intellectual property market-referential without
making it market-reverential.
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Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion
in Intellectual Property Law
INTRODUCTION
Agree, for the Law is costly. CWilliam Camden, 16051
Intellectual property law is a growth industry. It covers an ever-expanding
variety of subject matters, its protection lasts longer than ever, and its
entitlements increasingly intrude into realms of conduct once reserved for public
use. The blame (or, more rarely, credit) for this incessant growth usually falls
on the agents of positive lawCcourts and legislaturesCand the rent-seeking
rightsholders who influence them.
But when it comes to one aspect of this expansion, the increasing breadth of
intellectual property rights, much of the responsibility lies not with positive
law’s usual suspects, but with an organic, inadvertent process that results from
the interaction of indeterminate doctrine and risk-averse licensing. Copyright
law provides the best example. The copyright doctrines that determine where
private entitlement ends and public privilege begins are inherently ambiguous.
This means that those who want to make use of copyrighted material cannot
make accurate ex ante judgments regarding the need to secure a license from the
rightsholder. Yet making the wrong call can be costly, because the penalties for
infringement typically include supracompensatory damages and injunctive
relief. Combine these doctrinal gray areas and severe consequences with the
risk aversion that pervades key copyright industries, and the result is a practice
of securing copyright licenses even when none is needed. Better safe than sued.
In and of itself this state of affairs is unobjectionable, even laudable, in that
the market provides certainty where the law does not. But licensing markets are
not only the end result of legal doctrine; they are also instrumental in
determining the reach of copyright entitlements. If a rightsholder can show that
it routinely issues licenses for a given use, then copyright law views that use as
properly falling within the rightsholder’s control. Thus the practice of licensing
within gray areas eventually makes those areas less gray, as the licensing itself
becomes the proof that the entitlement covers the use. Over time, public
privilege recedes and the reach of copyright expands, moving the ubiquitous
gray areas farther into what used to be virgin territory, which in turn creates
more licensing markets, which in turn push the gray area even farther afield, and
so on. Lather, rinse, repeat.
This phenomenon, which I call “doctrinal feedback,” is unappreciated in the
intellectual property literature and unrecognized in the courts. Scholars and
judges focus instead on top-down developments in the positive lawCfederal
statutes, Supreme Court opinions, and so forthCnever imagining that major
transformations in the law could emerge from the bottom up, through
practitioners’ everyday application of longstanding, uncontroversial principles.
1.

WILLIAM CAMDEN, REMAINS CONCERNING BRITAIN 316 (EP Publishing 1974) (1605).
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For example, everyone agrees that certain copyright doctrines are ambiguous,
and this ambiguity can be advantageous because it allows courts to reach
equitable results despite substantial variation and complexity in the fact patterns
they encounter.2 Everyone also agrees that licensing practice should play a key
role in determining whether a given use falls within copyright’s entitlement.
Indeed, agreement on this issue unites otherwise disparate camps in copyright
scholarship.3 Finally, everyone agrees that it is usually in a user’s best interest
to secure a license rather than take even a small risk of an adverse judgment; the
simple reality is that finding out whether permission is required usually costs
more than getting permission. But because these propositions are so
uncontroversial, no one has noticed that their aggregate effect is an expansion in
the reach of intellectual property rightsCan expansion completely unconnected
to lobbying successes and courtroom victories.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that intellectual property’s growth is due
entirely to seemingly sensible doctrines and prudent behavior on the part of
everyone involved. Much of the recent expansion is obviously the result of
purposeful policy decisions by courts and legislaturesCand in certain areas such
positivist decisions provide the entire explanation (e.g., expansions in the
subject matter and duration of rights). But doctrinal feedback is its own animal,
quietly contributing to the seemingly ceaseless growth of intellectual property,
without relying on developments in legislation or litigation, on strategic
behavior in the marketplace, or on rent-seeking initiatives by moneyed interests.
In other words, even if intellectual property owners are guileless or have no
interest in gaming the system, and even if statutes and case law are not overly
favorable to rightsholders, the combination of ambiguous doctrine and riskaverse licensing will, over time, cause entitlements to grow and public privilege
to shrink.
In this Article, I describe how doctrinal feedback works in intellectual
property’s three core disciplines and then address its normative implications.
Part I looks at copyright law, where feedback’s autocatalytic effect is
particularly pronounced. It expands on the description given above, explores
the sources of the risk aversion that produces so much unneeded licensing, and
identifies those copyright uses and industries most likely to experience rights
accretion.
Part II covers trademark law, where doctrinal feedback produces a less
pervasive and more attenuated expansion, for two reasons. First, legal
ambiguities and risk aversion are responsible for only some of trademark’s
superfluous licensing markets; others are the result of mutually beneficial
promotional arrangements, such as product placement in film and television,
which do not consistently feed back into the licensing calculus. Second,
trademark law looks to consumer confusion, not licensing markets, when
defining the reach of its entitlements, which means feedback occurs only when
consumer perception reflects an acquired familiarity with licensing practices. I
2.
3.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Part I.B.
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use research from the behavioral sciencesCnever before cited in the trademark
literatureCto show that consumers acquire this familiarity much more readily
than trademark law acknowledges.
Part III discusses patent law, where doctrinal feedback, although present, is
muted and produces no systemic expansion of entitlements. The difference is
partly doctrinal (patent law does not use licensing information to define the
overall reach of its entitlements) and partly purposeful (courts in patent cases are
more skeptical of the informational content of licensing markets). Because
patent law manages to make use of licensing information without suffering its
distortive effects, however, it holds lessons for how we might address the more
pernicious and expansive doctrinal feedback found in copyright and trademark.
I apply those lessons in Part IV, where I cease being descriptive and instead
consider the normative implications of doctrinal feedback. The first normative
question is whether doctrinal feedback is a problem. For those who generally
oppose the expansion of intellectual property law, the answer is clearly yesCbut
I also show that those who favor an expansion should view doctrinal feedback
as a poor means to that end. The next question is how one might solve the
feedback problem. Reducing the risk aversion that fuels feedback is one
obvious tactic, but that approach produces counterintuitive results laden with
normative baggage, threatens to substitute a positivist expansion for an accretive
one, and creates more problems than it cures. In the end, I suggest a more
normatively neutral solution, consisting of subtle refinements in how the
positive law scrutinizes licensing information and consumer motivation. This
approach allows intellectual property to be market-referential without making it
market-reverential.
I.

COPYRIGHT’S FEEDBACK LOOP

Doctrinal feedback in copyright law arises from several uncontroversial
premises. First, core doctrinesCthe idea/expression dichotomy, the substantial
similarity test, and the fair use defenseCcreate significant ambiguity regarding
the reach of copyright rights. Second, new creative works almost invariably
borrow from old creative works, which raises the possibility of infringement on
the part of the borrower. Third, the penalties for copyright infringement are
severe; monetary awards often vastly exceed what the defendant might have
paid for a license, and injunctions are easy to come by. Fourth, the players in
key copyright industries tend to be risk averse, a tendency exacerbated by high
up-front investments and the need to satisfy conservative insurers and
downstream distributors.
In combination, these factors cause copyright users to seeks licenses even
when they have a good fair use claimCi.e, even when proceeding unlicensed
would probably result in no liability. This practice of unneeded licensing feeds
back into doctrine through one final uncontroversial premise: the fair use
defense looks to the existence vel non of a licensing market when defining the
reach of the copyright entitlement. The result is a steady, incremental,
unintended expansion of copyright, caused by nothing more than ambiguous
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doctrine and prudent behavior on the part of copyright users.
A. Doctrinal Indeterminacy and the Risk-Averse Actor
Picture a filmmaker, camera in hand, interviewing passers-by on the streets
of Cleveland for a documentary about the migration of American manufacturing
jobs overseas. In one particularly poignant piece of footage, a homeless former
factory worker spontaneously sings a lyric from a Bruce Springsteen song:
They’re closing down the textile mill across the railroad tracks.
Foreman says these jobs are going, boys, and they ain’t coming back.4

In post-production, as the filmmaker edits this clip into the documentary, she
notices the singular features of Cleveland’s Rock and Roll Hall of Fame
looming in the background of the shot. The singing worker is also holding a
copy of Newsweek, the cover of which is clearly visible. The thought crosses
her mind: does she need permission to include the building in her film? The
photograph on the magazine cover? For that matter, what about the two lines
from the Springsteen song?
The prudent filmmaker would consult her lawyer, who would tell her that
copyright law does indeed cover architectural, pictorial, and musical works, and
that she may well have violated copyright’s exclusive rights by including the
building, photograph, and song excerpt in her film.5 On the bright side, her
lawyer would probably also mention copyright’s fair use defense and the
protection it sometimes gives to defendants who make incidental and
transformative use of copyrighted works.
But what would her lawyer’s advice on fair use actually be?
This is an important question for our documentarian, because the fair use
doctrine is the last exit off the highway to infringement. It is often the only
thing standing between a litigant and liability. Fortunately, for those litigants
who need it, the doctrine is endlessly malleable. It excuses a wide range of
conduct, from parodying a pop song,6 to making personal copies of television
programs for later viewing,7 to reverse-engineering a computer program for
interoperability purposes.8 It can mutate into whatever form copyright’s
objectives demand.9
Fair use’s adaptability, however, is a double-edged sword. Determining
whether fair use excuses a defendant’s conduct requires application of four
4. Bruce Springsteen, My Hometown, BORN IN THE U.S.A. (1983).
5. Whether the incidental inclusion of the building, cover, and song snippet is in fact a
copyright violation is not entirely clear. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
COPYRIGHT, ' 13.05[D][3]. As we will soon see, however, this lack of clarity is key to the
phenomenon of doctrinal feedback.
6. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
7. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
8. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
9. Fair use “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.” Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. Am. Broad.
Cos., 621 F. 2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)).
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complicated, interdependent, and non-exclusive statutory factors10 and analysis
of over 160 years of case law11Can intimidating and expensive undertaking.12
The case law has been particularly unhelpful. The Supreme Court’s first
incursions into fair use immediately struck a chord that still resonates in the
jurisprudence: the doctrine’s equitable, fact-specific, and thus indeterminate
nature.13 Those who were hoping for hard and fast rules were out of luck, and
have remained so since. From the ex post perspective of the defendant already
embroiled in the expense of litigation, then, an adaptable, equitable defense is
useful. But for the prospective defendant wondering whether a given act will
prove to be infringing, fair use is too ambiguous to provide much ex ante
guidance.14
This is not to say that our filmmaker has nothing on which to base a liability
prediction. The 160 years of fair use case law have produced a number of
decisions that address the incidental use of copyrighted materials in movies.
Some of these cases support the filmmaker’s fair use argument.15 Others do
not.16 Presumably she and her lawyer could read the cases, extract those
principles most relevant to her situation, and simply make a call.
In reality, however, they would do no such thing, because the risk is too
10. 17 U.S.C. ' 107.
11. Although it did not actually use the term “fair use,” Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342,
344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), is commonly cited as the foundation of modern fair use analysis.
12. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 187 (2004) (“[F]air use . . . simply means the right
to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”); Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping
Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 566 (1997) (pointing out that “fair use
. . . is hard to predict in advance and that it will be expensive to prove”); Jessica Litman,
Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OREGON L. REV. 19, 45-46 (1996) (“[F]air
use is a troublesome privilege because it requires a hideously expensive trial to prove that one’s
actions come within its shelter.”).
13. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (“[F]air
use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case.”); Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 (1984) (referring to fair use as an
“equitable rule of reason” and citing with approval legislative history that asserts the
impossibility of articulating a generally applicable definition). The Court’s previous fair use
cases had resulted in summary affirmance by an equally divided Court. Williams & Wilkins Co.
v. United States, 420 U.S. 376 (1975); Columbia Broadcast Sys. v. Loew’s, Inc., 356 U.S. 40
(1958).
14. The leading treatise underscores fair use’s ambiguity, noting that the three major
Supreme Court decisions on fair use “were overturned at each level of review, two of them by
split opinions at the Supreme Court level.” 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, ' 13.05. And it
was the foundational fair use case, Folsom v. Marsh, that gave rise to Justice Story’s famous
statement that “[p]atents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging
to forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions
are, or at least may be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.” 9 F. Cas. at
344.
15. E.g., Jackson v. Warner Bros., Inc., 993 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Monster
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Amsinck v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Mura v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
16. E.g., Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2nd Cir. 1997);
Brown v. McCormick, 23 F. Supp. 2d 594, 608 (D. Md. 1998).
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great. Not only is fair use famously ambiguous, but the price of making the
wrong call is prohibitively high. Injunctions issue as a matter of course in
copyright casesCand not just upon proof of liability: a copyright owner that
proves likelihood of success on the merits presumptively wins a preliminary
injunction without any need to show irreparable injury.17 If our filmmaker
proceeds without a license, she faces the prospect of a lawsuit that could bring
her production to a screeching halt and force her to negotiate permissions from
those who hold her livelihood hostage, even if her fair use claim would
ultimately prove meritorious. And if she loses the fair use argument, then she
faces not only a permanent injunction, but a myriad of other sanctionsCstatutory
damages, disgorgement of profits, attorney’s feesCthat may far exceed any
license fee she would have had to pay.18
In these circumstances, even a risk-neutral actor with a good fair use claim
would choose to secure a license rather than take the small risk of incurring a
severe penalty. This is particularly so when the use of the copyrighted material,
although incidental, is conspicuous. Take our filmmaker example: Newsweek is
one of the country’s most popular periodicals. The Rock and Roll Hall of Fame
is instantly recognizable to anyone who has seen it. The Springsteen song was a
top-ten hit.19 In all likelihood, then, unless her lack of liability is crystal-clear
(and it rarely is, given the legal ambiguities), she will seek a license from all
three potential plaintiffs before any of them so much as gets wind of her project.
This “license, don’t litigate” tendency is compounded by two other factors.
First, other key copyright doctrines share fair use’s indeterminacy. For instance,
copyright protects an author’s individualized expression, but his or her more
abstract ideas are free for the taking.20 Yet distinguishing between idea and
expression is difficult; as Learned Hand once despaired, “Nobody has ever been
able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”21 We find similar ambiguity in
the “substantial similarity” standard by which courts evaluate how much
copying is too much copying.22 Even if fair use were less imprecise, then, we
would often be hard-pressed to determine exactly where private entitlement ends
and public privilege begins.
Second, and more important, the decisionmakers in the real world of
copyright practice are typically risk averse. New works of creativity often
require high up-front investment, with the prospect of profit only after the work
is completed. With so much at risk, those who work with copyrighted materials
17. Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1174 (9th Cir.
1989); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1254 (3d Cir. 1983);
Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 1982);
Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1977).
18. 17 U.S.C. '' 502 (injunctions), 504 (damages and profits), 505 (attorney’s fees).
19. The song hit number six on the Billboard Hot 100 in 1986.
20. 17 U.S.C. ' 102(b).
21. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
22. “The determination of the extent of similarity that will constitute a substantial, and
hence infringing, similarity presents one of the most difficult questions in copyright law, and one
that is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations.” 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5,
' 13.03[A] (footnote omitted).
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try hard to avoid potential pitfalls, and understandably so. They approach legal
issues very conservatively, particularly issues like copyright liability, which
have the potential to destroy or delay the entire project.
Examples abound. How-to books on copyright lawCeven those that do a
good job explaining complex issues in plain EnglishCtell readers to invoke fair
use sparingly. “When in doubt, don’t,” they advise,23 heedless of the fact that
doubt is copyright’s constant companion. Publishers reduce the complexities of
fair use to conservative bright-line rules that sacrifice accuracy for clarity: you
may quote no more than X number of words, or lines, or paragraphs.24 (The
results sometimes border on the absurd, as when The New York Times seeks a
license to excerpt four lines of poetry in a column that makes fun of
publishers.25) The recording industry develops a practice of demanding and
paying for licenses even when they are not needed.26 Even institutions of higher
learning, which one would think have an interest in a more free-flowing
information culture, implement overly restrictive and reductive fair use
policies.27
These risk-averse tendencies are even more prominent among moneyed
actors in mainstream industries like television and feature film, for two reasons.
23. MICHAEL C. DONALDSON, CLEARANCE & COPYRIGHT 67 (2d ed. 2003); accord STEPHEN
FISHMAN, THE COPYRIGHT HANDBOOK: HOW TO PROTECT & USE WRITTEN WORKS 11/4 (7th ed.
2003); RICHARD STIM, GETTING PERMISSION: HOW TO LICENSE & CLEAR COPYRIGHTED
MATERIALS ONLINE & OFF 9/5 (2000); Lloyd J. Jassin, Fair Use in a Nutshell: A Roadmap to
Copyright’s Most Important Exception, http://copylaw.com/new_articles/fairuse.html (last
visited May 8, 2006).
24. “[A]lthough there is no legally established word limit for fair use, many publishers act
as if there were one and require their authors to obtain permission to quote more then [sic] a
specified number of words (ranging from 100 to 1,000 words).” FISHMAN, supra note 23, at
11/8. Despite his admonition, Fishman adds his own rule: “never quote more than a few
successive paragraphs from a book or article, one or two lines from a poem, or take more than
one graphic such as a chart, diagram or illustration.” Id.; see also MARJORIE HEINS & TRICIA
BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT CONTROL 15-16
(2005) (discussing specific numerical limits imposed by print publishers).
25. See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1077 (1998).
26. Matthew Africa, Comment, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use Analysis:
New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1174-75 (2000).
27. One example, from the University of California:
It is important to understand that the law does not grant individuals the right to
determine if they are making a fair use of a copyrighted work, rather, it provides
guidelines for courts to make this decision on a case by case basis. Fair Use analysis
is not simple and the outcome of a Fair Use defense is not predictable. It is unwise to
assume that you are not infringing a copyright unless the specific use has been
determined by case law to be non-infringing based on Fair Use, such as video taping
television broadcasts for home use or copying a portion of a work to provided
comment or criticism.
University of California, Office of the President, Office of Technology Transfer, Using
Copyrighted Works of Others, http://www.ucop.edu/ott/crothers.html (2001); see also William
W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1694 (1988)
(“[A]s almost any college teacher can attest, the information presently being given faculty by
university counsel regarding how much copyrighted material they may reproduce for classroom
use is distinctly unhelpful.”).
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First, as the amount of money involved increases, so does the risk aversion.
The more one has to loseCeither in the form of initial investment or expected
returnCthe more willing one is to incur marginal prophylactic expenses.
Second, mainstream works intended for mass consumption have traditionally
used a multi-tiered distribution model, in which a number of discrete parties
need to be convinced that legal claims are unlikely. Even if our documentary
filmmaker is willing to roll the dice on a fair use claim, she may need the
backing of a major studio in order to get the movie made, and will almost
certainly need a commercial distributor to get it into first-run theaters, pay-perview channels, the DVD market, and broadcast and cable television. Each of
these stops along the distribution chain invites a new party to the table, and that
party needs to be satisfied that the product it is peddling is not a time bomb of
copyright liability. If the filmmaker is not inclined to be risk averse, then, one
of these downstream players will be, and the end result will be the same.28 Thus
one film that reportedly cost $218 to make required an additional $230,000
investment in licensing fees before a distributor was willing to take it on.29
In the movie industry, errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurance usually
fulfills this need for a risk-averse approach.30 For a relatively small premium
(less than $10,000 for an independent film with no obvious legal problems), a
filmmaker can obtain a policy that provides the protection necessary to placate
the players at all levels.31 The premium, however, represents only part of the
price. The typical E&O insurance application not only presumes that the
applicant has already paid an attorney to obtain clearances, but also requires the
preparation of a copyright report setting forth a detailed history of the work and
any related works.32 Written releases are necessary for all names, faces, and
likenessesCeven in fictional storiesCand for any distinctive locations.33 “Film
clips are dangerous,” says the application, and their use requires licenses not just
from the filmmaker, but from “all persons rendering services or supplying
material contained in the film clip.”34 Special attention must be paid to music,
because of the hard-line position that music publishers take with regard to the

28. KEITH AOKI, JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS, BOUND BY LAW 53-54 (2006)
(discussing effect on licensing when broadcasters and others mass distributors enter the picture);
PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, UNTOLD STORIES: CREATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
RIGHTS CLEARANCE CULTURE FOR DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS 5 (2005) (“Programmers, insurers
and distributors are primarily concerned about legal risk to lawsuit, however frivolous . . . .”);
HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 55 (noting that “gatekeeper-intermediariesCpublishers,
broadcasters, distributors, and many ISPsC . . . care less about legal niceties or the rights of users
than about avoiding expensive lawsuits.”).
29. Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, ' 2, at
13 (discussing the film Tarnation).
30. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 9 (calling E&O insurance the “chokepoint” of
rights).
31. DONALDSON, supra note 23, at 199.
32. Id. at 47, 203, 211, 214.
33. Id. at 214. Obviously some of these requirements speak to claims under something
other than copyright law, such as trademark and right of publicity.
34. Id. at 215.
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need for new licenses for each reuse.35 Any failed attempt to secure a release
must be reported on the application.36 And woe betide him who fails to fulfill
the insurer’s demands that everything be licensed; filing a claim on an E&O
policy can be the death knell for any future project.37
My purpose here is not to indict insurers. They are simply facilitating the
risk aversion of the other players in the industry. And those who wish to avoid
this licensing morass can choose not to include in their films anything drawn
from existing material, or can assume the risk themselves by using nontraditional distribution methods like the Internet or other self-publishing.38
But the E&O insurance application casts one important point in stark relief:
being held liable is a secondary concern. It’s being sued at all that poses the
greater threat. The applicant must report any intellectual-property-related claims
brought against him or her in the last five years, whether successful or not, plus
any prospect of claims relating to the current project and any facts under which
a claim “might reasonably be asserted or legal proceeding instituted.”39 Any
matter “potentially actionable” must be removed from the script.40 And the
application closes with a general admonition to focus not on the merits of a
potential claim, but on “the likelihood of any claim or litigation.”41 Again,
better safe than sued.
From the perspective of the risk-averse actor, this makes sense. The ready
availability of a preliminary injunction that can stop a production in midstream
is enough to strike fear in the heart of any investor, not to mention the
distraction and expense of defending against a lawsuit. Transactional attorneys
are accordingly paid not to avoid liability, but to avoid litigation. And when
they combine their clients’ understandable risk aversion with the ambiguity of
the applicable legal doctrines, they are to be praised, not blamed, for advising
the negotiation of licenses.42 As one how-to book sagely states, “An unfinished
project, no matter how brilliantly conceived, is preferable to a lawsuit for
copyright infringement any day.”43
35. Id.
36. Id. at 211.
37. “If you ever have a claim on E&O insurance, you might as well go into another line of
work. You can never file a claim or you get blacklistedCand never be insured again.”
AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 23 (quoting historical filmmaker Robert Stone).
38. “At one extreme is the film world, where a clearance culture and the need for E&O
insurance have nearly obliterated fair use. At the other end of the spectrum are the students, Web
activists, and artists who freely appropriate copyrighted or trademarked material for creative
purposes.” HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 54.
39. DONALDSON, supra note 23, at 212.
40. Id. at 214.
41. Id. at 215.
42. Fisher, supra note 27, at 1693 (“The most telling indication of the seriousness of [the
indeterminacy of fair use] is the character of the advice currently being given the members of
those groups by their lawyers.”).
43. LEE WILSON, FAIR USE, FREE USE, AND USE BY PERMISSION 153 (2005). Wilson also
provides a related example of wise (if dismaying) advice:
Never decide to use a copyrighted work after you have been denied permission to do
so. Your transgression will be no greater than it would have been had you never
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Small wonder, then, that two recent studiesCone that focused on
documentary filmmakers, the other on the larger creative communityCfound
that overly conservative licensing practices predominate even in the face of
good fair use claims, resulting in a licensing culture that significantly and
negatively impacts the creation of valuable new works.44 In the end, copyright’s
substantive law matters very little, except in its ambiguity.45
B. Market Circularity
We now see that risk-averse actors in important copyright industries tend to
seek copyright licenses when they don’t need to. That’s the first piece of the
doctrinal feedback puzzle. The second piece is equally uncontroversial, viz.:
fair use doctrine places substantial weight on existing licensing practices. In
other words, when a court is determining whether a given use of copyrighted
material is fair, one important factor is whether there already exists a licensing
market for the use in question. If such a market does not exist, then the fair use
claim gains ground. If the market does exist, then the fair use claim loses
ground. I call this puzzle piece uncontroversial because the link between
licensing practice and fair use doctrine is widely accepted not only by the courts,
but also by a varied collection of scholars who hold otherwise divergent views
on fair use.
First, the courts. The statutory definition of fair use sets forth four factors
for judges to consider in deciding whether a given use is fair.46 Although they
remain free to consider other factors as well, the four that the statute explicitly
lists tend to dominate the jurisprudence.47 And the Supreme Court, the lower
courts, and commentators have all recognized that of the four, it is the last
factorC“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work”Cthat is the most important.48
Within this “market effect” factor, however, lies the danger of circularity, in
requested such permission, but your action in defiance of the denial of permission to
use the work is likely to anger the owner of the copyright. Anger is an important
ingredient in lawsuits.
Id. at 152. Such is the power that risk aversion puts in the hands of copyright owners. Creators
of new works are advised to seek permission when in doubt as the legality of their activity (and
such doubt almost always exists), and when that permission is refused they are advised not to
take the chance that it was not needed in the first place.
44. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28; HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24.
45. “The rules that publishers impose upon writers, the rules that film distributors impose
upon filmmakers, the rules that newspapers impose upon journalistsCthere are the real laws
governing creativity.” LESSIG, supra note 12, at 187.
46. 17 U.S.C. ' 107.
47. See, e.g., Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171,
1175 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980).
48. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985);
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th Cir. 1996);
Triangle Publ’ns, 626 F.2d at 1175; see also 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, ' 13.05[A][4]
(“If one looks to the fair use cases, if not always to their stated rationale, this emerges as the most
important, and indeed, central fair use factor.”) (footnotes omitted).
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which market effect plays the part of both premise and conclusion. Whether a
given use affects a work’s market depends on whether the copyright owner has
the legal authority to exact payment for that use. And it is that legal authority
that is the ultimate question to be answered in fair use analysis. In other words,
we cannot know the market effect until we first decide whether there is a market
to be affectedCyet market effect is supposed to help us make that decision.
Some courts recognize the tautologic potential here.49 Their usual response
is to try to break the vicious circle by disregarding purely theoretical revenue
streams, focusing instead on “those that creators of original works would in
general develop or license others to develop”50 or that are “traditional,
reasonable, or likely to be developed.”51 When the defendant’s use has only
recently become possible (e.g., because it uses a new technology), these
standards may do little to clear the muddy waters of circularity; who can say
whether an unforeseen use is “reasonable” or is “likely to be developed” by the
copyright owner? But when the use is one that has been around long enough for
a licensing market to develop, the presence or absence of such a market goes a
long way toward deciding the case.52 In effect, then, fair use jurisprudence in
established industries depends a great deal on customary practice.
The fair use scholarship ends up in much the same place, albeit sometimes
by a different route. Scholarly references to customary licensing practices as a
fair use factor go back some ninety years (making them even older than court
references),53 but licensing markets are perhaps most significant to those
modern-day scholars who view fair use as an agent of economic efficiency.
Their argument is straightforward: fair use exists to ensure that welfareenhancing uses of copyrighted material will take place even when transaction
costs impede consensual market transfers of copyright permissions.54 It follows
that when established practice shows that consensual transfer is possibleCi.e.,
when the particular use is in fact consistently licensedCthe fair use defense is

49. E.g., Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.,
60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994). Other courts don’t recognize the danger of circularity. E.g.,
Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 447 F.3d 769, 781 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Whenever a user puts copyrighted software to uses beyond the uses it bargained for, it affects
the legitimate market for the product.”).
50. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994).
51. Am. Geophysical, 60 F.3d at 930.
52. E.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567-69 (1985);
Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387; Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26
U.S.P.Q. 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
53. E.g., ARTHUR W. WEIL, AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 429 (1917); RICHARD C. DE WOLF,
AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 143 (1925); Elizabeth Filcher Miller, Note, CopyrightsC“Fair
Use,” 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 249, 250 (1942); Saul Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 43, 51-52 (1955). The oldest judicial use of licensing
practicesCor, more accurately, the lack thereofCin a fair use case is in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.,
26 U.S.P.Q. at 42.
54. The foundational article is Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600
(1982).
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unavailable.55
Curiously, scholars who reject this economic approach nevertheless come to
the same conclusion.56 For example, Lloyd Weinreb argues that customary
practice should heavily influence fair use determinations, not because it is a
proxy for economic efficiency, but because fair use embodies notions of
fundamental fairness that transcend narrow consideration of copyright’s
utilitarian underpinnings.57 Gideon Parchomovsky views fair use through a
Kantian lens of individual rights and autonomy, yet he too concludes that “only
users whose takings comport with customary practices that govern creative
activities in the relevant community should be able to avail themselves of the
fair use doctrine.”58 And Michael Madison’s “pattern-oriented” approach to fair
use asks “whether an individual’s use of a work without the consent of the
copyright owner is consistent with a provable social or cultural pattern of
conduct.”59
Scholars of all stripes thus agree with the courts: the existence vel non of
traditional licensing markets should play an important role in determining
whether fair use protects an unauthorized use of copyrighted material. As we
will now see, however, when we combine this perfectly reasonable
consideration with the perfectly reasonable, risk-averse, “license, don’t litigate”
attitude that prevails in important copyright industries, something strange
happens. I call it “doctrinal feedback,” and it is the source of inadvertent
expansion in the reach of copyright entitlements.
C. Copyright’s Doctrinal Feedback
1. How It Works
Doctrinal feedback works like this. In Year One, X wants to incorporate
part of Y’s copyrighted work into X’s project. Assume X’s use is transformative
and involves a quantitatively and qualitatively small portion of published
material. In other words, under the first three statutory factors, it’s a decent fair
use candidate.60 As for the fourth factor, there is no established licensing
55. Id. at 1613, 1615; Fisher, supra note 27, at 1727-29.
56. Wendy Gordon is now arguably one such scholar, her views on fair use having evolved
since her 1982 article. She now sees the market as an imperfect measure of the values that the
doctrine represents. See Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use:
Commodification and Market Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 149
(Niva Elkin-Koren and Neil Weinstock Netanel eds. 2002). Yet despite her apostasy, she still
concludesCif for somewhat different reasonsCthat established licensing practice should be a
major factor in fair use analysis. See Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 75, 90 (2004).
57. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1137, 1159-61 (1990).
58. Gideon Parchomovsky, Fair Use, Efficiency, and Corrective Justice, 3 LEGAL THEORY
347, 349 (1997).
59. Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1525, 1530 (2004).
60. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552-53, 564-65
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market for X’s use. So X figures that he has a good shotClet’s say 80%Cat a
fair use defense. But that still leaves a 20% chance the use might be ruled
infringing. X, being risk averse and aware of the severe consequences of an
adverse ruling, decides not to take that chance and so seeks and pays for a
license from Y instead.
Over time, other similarly situated parties follow suit. By Year Three, then,
there has emerged a widespread, active licensing market for the kind of use in
which X engaged. This means that in Year Four, the chances of winning a fair
use argument for X’s kind of use have dropped considerably, because the
existence of the licensing market militates against a fair use finding. Now the
use that was 80/20 in favor of fair use is more like 20/80 against. The riskaverse preference for licensing has circled back around into the doctrinal
analysis and the reach of Y’s copyright has expanded. This expanded reach also
means that related uses of Y’s work that once would have been considered even
more safe than X’s will start to become more risky, because the newly expanded
licensing market affects the analysis in related markets as well.
On the one hand, then, we have legal standards that quite reasonably look to
the existence of a licensing market when defining the breadth of fair use. On
the other, we have an equally reasonable and possibly laudable tendency to
obtain licenses where none may be needed. Over time, fair use naturally shrinks
and the scope of copyright expands. Rather than disappearing, copyright’s gray
areas move farther into conduct that used to be reserved for public use. This
movement creates more licensing markets, which in turn push the gray area even
farther afield, and so forth.
What about those who resist the pressure to licenseCthe risk-takers who use
copyrighted material without authorization? Unfortunately, such mavericks do
little to stave off doctrinal feedback. For one thing, they are likely to be few and
far between, for reasons already explained, and will thus play no significant part
in determining the licensing culture. And even if they exist in greater-thanexpected numbers, their influence on licensing norms will be disproportionately
small, for two reasons. First, risk takers may rely on fair use, but that doesn’t
mean they want to have to prove their case in court. They will accordingly try to
keep their unlicensed conduct quiet.61 In contrast, copyright owners have every
reason to flaunt each license they secure. Second, because risk aversion
increases as projects get more expensive and mainstream, most risk takers will
come from smaller-scale projects that do not involve widespread distribution
through traditional channels. Unauthorized uses will therefore receive
disproportionately little attention when courts and practitioners evaluate

(1985) (holding that published works are better fair use candidates than unpublished works and
examining both quantitative and qualitative volume of copying); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (holding that fair use favors transformative uses).
61. The exception that proves the rule is the defendant in Princeton University Press v.
Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996), who was “something of
a crusader against the system under which his competitors ha[d] been paying agreed
royalties”Cand who paid the price when the court rejected his fair use claim.
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licensing practices.62
Foreign law constitutes one final distortive influence here. To the extent
that a film, book, song, etc. is intended for international distribution, the author
must worry about foreign intellectual property regimes, which can be more
restrictive than domestic law when it comes to unlicensed use of existing
works.63 The prevailing licensing practice in the U.S. might therefore reflect
these foreign restrictions, and courts and practitioners unwittingly invite those
restrictions into U.S. law by relying on that licensing market in domestic fair use
analysis.
2. Positive Law and Strategic Behavior
One of the interesting things about the doctrinal feedback phenomenon is
that it works an expansion of the copyright entitlement in an inadvertent,
accretive manner. The whole idea is that risk-averse behavior prevents fair use
claims from being litigated, so a licensing culture emerges based on very few
and very infrequent guidelines from the positive law. Instead of looking to
courts and statutes for guidance, practitioners look to the internal practices of
the relevant industries, and then apply the same market-referential standards that
they would expect courts to apply if they were ever to litigate.
This means that those typically blamed for copyright’s growthCcourts and
legislaturesCplay at best a secondary role in this insidious means of expansion.
Doctrinal feedback has little to do with case law and statutes, except insofar as
reported decisions entrench the statutory ambiguities that give rise to the risk
aversion in the first place. It is an independent phenomenon that works its
expansion regardless of whether courts and legislatures favor that outcome and
regardless of whether copyright owners engage in rent-seeking behavior. Even
if copyright owners were guileless or had no interest in gaming the system, and
even if statutes and case law were not overly favorable to rightsholders, the
combination of ambiguous doctrine and risk-averse tendencies would result in
an accretion of rights.
That said, strategic behavior on the part of copyright owners can certainly
exacerbate the accretive effect of doctrinal feedback. Indeed, the only two
commentators who have previously noticed this aspect of copyright circularity
have ascribed the phenomenon not to structural causes, as I do, but to
purposeful conduct on the part of entitlement holders.64 Such strategic behavior
62. Many who rely on fair use “are afraid to admit to doing so publicly, for fear of drawing
attention and legal action, whether frivolous or notCthus robbing the recourse of fair use from
public precedent.” AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 29-30.
63. For example, France allows no unauthorized use of unpublished works and provides
no catch-all fair use defense even for unpublished works. J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT
LAW 345, 447 (2d ed. 2003).
64. Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41 (1997) (ascribing growth of licensing
market to self-serving strategic agreements among repeat players); Africa, supra note 26, at 1166
(“Strategic behavior by users has not only prevented the creation of fair standards, it has
entrenched unfair ones.”).
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is not a necessary condition for doctrinal feedback, but if we relax the
assumption that everyone involved is ingenuous, we see that the feedback effect
is in fact highly manipulable. For example, the ubiquitous cease-and-desist
letter might represent rightsholders’ attempt to change the risk calculus in their
favor, because such a letter (whether threatening or conciliatory) tells the
recipient that the rightsholder knows of the use.65 Even when the argument for
liability is weak, the letter’s recipient knows that he or she can no longer hope to
proceed unnoticed.
Another way in which copyright owners might game the system is by
engaging in a sort of mutual backscratching: I’ll license your works if you
license mine. Both Lydia Pallas Loren and Matthew Africa have observed that
a large publishing or media company is as likely to be licensor as licensee,
because of its extensive collections of copyrighted works. Such repeat players
may therefore not fear a licensing culture, under the theory that the payments
they make and the payments they receive will net out.66
Yet if this sort of strategic backscratching is indeed a zero-sum game, one
might wonder why repeat players would purposely choose to encourage
licensing and its associated transaction costs rather than the alternative culture
of comparatively costless fair use. Indeed, Gideon Parchomovsky has suggested
that as a normative matter copyright should allow permissionless intra-industry
appropriationCi.e., members of a common authorial community should be able
to claim fair use of each other’s material because they share a reciprocal risk of
being infringed, which makes the intrusion on their property right in copyright
morally acceptable.67 As a descriptive matter, however, the publishing industry
apparently does just the opposite, as does the recording industry.68
Moreover, it is not clear that strategic behavior predominates, or even that
copyright owners understand the rent-seeking opportunities that doctrinal
feedback presents. The copyright literature is full of examples of rightsholders
who demand exorbitant fees for incidental uses from parties who cannot afford
them.69 If true, such examples suggest that copyright owners are not gaming the
system, or at least not in a way that consistently serves their self-interest,
because it is almost always in a rightsholder’s interest to agree to license an
arguably fair use, so as to create a market that can later be used to argue that the
65. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 29-37; Africa, at 1172.
66. Loren, supra note 64, at 41; Africa, supra note 26, at 1172. This argument has
surfaced in patent disputes as well. E.g., EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d 898,
907-08 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
67. Parchomovsky, supra note 58, at 370-71.
68. Loren, supra note 64, at 41; Africa, supra note 26, at 1174. Perhaps the explanation is
that non-economic considerations, such as a sense of moral desert, play a role in the formation of
licensing practices. More likely, however, is that licensing markets that form within a given
group are not entirely internal, but instead can be used to rebut a fair use argument made by
someone external to the industry. See Loren, supra note 64, at 41-43.
69. E.g., AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 12-19; HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24,
at 19; LESSIG, supra note 12, at 95-97; see also AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 12-13
(describing “most favored nation” clauses that require licensees to pay all rightsholders the
highest fee that it negotiates with any of them).
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use is not in fact fair.70 The only reason to refuse to license in such
circumstances is to engage in brand management (i.e., the use imposes
unacceptable congestion costs or tarnishes the work)71 or to send an inflationary
price signal (i.e., prospective licensees need to know that the rightsholder cannot
always be bargained down). Even then, granting a license remains an attractive
option unless the licensing market is already so well established that the
likelihood of a successful fair use claim has become negligible.
On the opposite side of the transaction, copyright users may or may not be
aware of doctrinal feedback and its consequences, but here too the feedback will
occur regardless of the participants’ awareness. Yet unlike copyright owners,
copyright users will find it hard to manipulate doctrinal feedback to their
advantage once they become aware of it, because they face a collective action
problem: if one of them resists licensing but the rest do not, the resistor is facing
a tougher fair use argument.72 Even if users realize that they are digging their
own grave every time they agree to a license, then, resistance only helps if a
critical mass of users resist. This is a classic prisoner’s dilemma, and
overcoming the dilemma’s usual barriers to trust and coordination is difficult,
particularly when the insurers come calling. Besides, copyright users may not
be getting fully disinterested advice. Once we relax our assumption of
ingenuousness, we must realize that the lawyers who counsel clients on the need
to license have a strategic interest too: advising clients to seek a license creates
more earning opportunities for transactional attorneys than does advising them
to roll the dice on a fair use claim.
3. Affected Markets
Where might we expect doctrinal feedback to be the most pronounced? The
answer to this question depends on a number of factors. In descending order of
importance, they are: the parties involved, the content being used, the mens rea
of the user, and the uniformity of the legal precedent.
As already discussed, where moneyed actors predominate, where multiple
parties must sign off on the use, and where up-front costs are highest, increased
risk aversion and a strong feedback effect are most likely. Thus reliance of fair
use will probably be the least frequent and the least well received in the feature
70. See Loren, supra note 64, at 42-43.
71. See Laura Bradford, Parody and Perception: Using Cognitive Research To Expand
Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2005) (describing approach to fair use based on
preserving value of work); see also James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 167, 216-20 (2005) (discussing copyright as vehicle for censorship rather than
exploitation of work).
72. See Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381
(6th Cir. 1996) (finding no fair use on part of one copy shop that resisted licensing arrangements
to which its competitors had agreed). One resistance tactic less vulnerable to the prisoner’s
dilemma problem would be for users to insist on “escape clauses” in their licensing agreements,
under which they explicitly deny the legal necessity for the license even as they agree to it. This
approach has enjoyed some success in the patent context. Burgess Cellulose Co. v. Wood Flong
Corp., 431 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1970).
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film industry, with its high initial investments, availability of funds for licenses,
and tiered distribution system. Indeed, one recent study concluded that “a
clearance culture and the need for E&O insurance have nearly obliterated fair
use” in the film world.73 We find some of the same characteristics in the
traditional music, broadcasting, advertising, and publishing industries. Together
these represent almost all of copyright’s most significant markets.74 In contrast,
starving artists who rely on online distribution and other affordable, neoteric
channels of trade are least likely to suffer a feedback effect,75 and private fair
uses like the time-shifting in the well-known Betamax case will likewise be
relatively unaffected.76
The nature of the content taken from the copyright owner also affects the
risk calculus: the more detectable the appropriation, the more likely the license.
Literal copyingCe.g., taking footage from a movieCwill be the most apparent to
the investors, insurers, and potential plaintiffs from whom pressure to license
emanates. It is easy for the money man to notice that the film he is underwriting
uses a clip from The Godfather, and thus to demand that the use be licensed. It
is not as easy for him to notice that the film borrows a plot device from The
Godfather.77 Thus uses involving “fragmented literal similarity,”78 where the
second work incorporates discrete snippets of expression directly copied from
the first work (a few seconds of film footage, a few bars of a song, a few lines of
a poem), are most likely to lead to doctrinal feedback. This has particular
significance in our modern “remix culture,” in which recombination of old
expression is an increasingly essential step in the creation of new works.79
To a lesser extent, the awareness of the borrower that something has been
borrowed will affect whether a licensing culture develops. The user of
copyrighted material will only consider seeking a license when he or she realizes
that such a use has taken place; when the use is accidental and incidental rather
than purposeful, the prospect of seeking a license might never even occur to the
user. Ignorance, however, is not bliss: this scenario is unlikely to play much of
a role in retarding the accretive expansion of the copyright entitlement because
it is unlikely that many users will be ignorant or will maintain their ignorance as
their work moves from creation to distribution.80 Those who earn a living from
73. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 54.
74. The lone exception is probably software. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK, COPYRIGHT
INDUSTRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 18 (2004) (describing copyright’s core industries).
75. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 54.
76. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447-55 (1984)
(holding that recording television programs for later viewing on Betamax was fair use).
77. Furthermore, more abstract and obscure takings may not need to rely on fair use; the
idea/expression dichotomy and de minimis defense will provide some cover. If so, feedback is
even less likely, because (unlike fair use) the application of the idea/expression dichotomy and
the de minimis defense does not depend on the existence of a licensing market.
78. This term is from the Nimmer treatise. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5,
' 13.03[A][2].
79. See Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
575, 578-79 (2005) (discussing prevalence and importance of “remix culture”).
80. I am speaking descriptively here. As a normative matter, incidental and accidental uses
might be better fair use candidates than purposeful uses (all else being equal), because when the
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working with copyrighted materials tend to be sensitive to the licensing issue.81
Moreover, in those industries where several different players must sign off on a
given work, someone in the distribution chain is bound to notice the
incorporation of copyrighted material, particularly when it is of the “fragmented
literal similarity” kind. And both ignorance and bliss will disappear entirely if,
upon the work’s release, the copyright owner notices the use and sends the user
a cease-and-desist letter or files suit. At that point, the user must confront the
same “license or litigate” question that he or she had theretofore unwittingly
managed to avoid.
Finally, even the risk-averse will presumably not seek a license in the face
of clear legal precedent that obviates the need to do so. Such uses will thus not
be vulnerable to the feedback effect. Unfortunately, there are few areas in
which the case law provides clear precedent. Even in the case most favorable to
creators who reuse copyrighted material, the Supreme Court remanded for
further consideration of licensing evidence,82 and the Court has been adamant in
its view that each case is unique and fact-dependent.83 Nor has the Court ever
clarified the other ambiguous doctrines in feedback’s causal chain (the
idea/expression dichotomy and the substantial similarity test).84 Case law from
the lower courts is, not surprisingly, both more developed and more diverse.
For every case that finds an incidental background use fair, there is another that
does not.85 When the defendant manages to prevail, the holding sometimes
reflects not an informed approach to licensing evidence, but a failure to consider
it at all.86 And when we bring foreign law into the pictureCa necessary
defendant has purposely chosen to incorporate the plaintiff’s work, there’s a better argument that
there was something about the work that the defendant values and should pay for. Cf. Africa,
supra note 26, at 1175 (viewing unknowing incidental use as “perhaps [the] most troubling”
aspect of feedback effect).
81. See generally AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28 (demonstrating awareness of
licensing issue among independent documentary filmmakers).
82. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 , 593-94 (1994).
83. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) (“[F]air
use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case.”); Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 (1984) (referring to fair use as an
“equitable rule of reason” and citing with approval legislative history that asserts the
impossibility of articulating a generally applicable definition).
84. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 5, ' 13.03[E][1][b] (“In recent decades, the
Supreme Court has confronted numerous copyright issues; yet none of those cases posed the
line-drawing issue of how far a defendant can go without committing prima facie
infringement.”). The only case in which the Court can be said to have focused on the distinction
between idea and expression was Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), which because of its age
and the nature of the materials involved (accounting books and charts) does little to clear up the
larger idea/expression ambiguity, giving rise instead to the narrower merger doctrine.
85. E.g., compare Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40
(S.D.N.Y. 1934) (conjecturing that “the instance of a person being photographed incidentally
reading a current magazine in which the copyrighted cover of a magazine was reproduced as a
matter of background” would be a fair use), with Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television,
Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2nd Cir. 1997) (finding no fair use where pictorial work was used for
twenty-seven seconds in background of television show).
86. E.g., Monster Commc’ns, Inc. v. Turner Broadcasting Sys., 935 F. Supp. 490
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consideration for those many users who eye global distributionCeven a clear
Supreme Court interpretation of U.S. law will do little good.
In sum, copyright’s doctrinal feedback is most pronounced in big-money
industries like film, music, and publishing that combine literal takings with high
costs, deep pockets, and multi-tiered distribution. It takes place regardless of
whether copyright owners know about or try to manipulate it, regardless of
whether copyright users know and want to do something about it, and regardless
of whether the positive law of copyright also expands. This is not to say that
doctrinal feedback is not manipulable (it is) or that copyright owners do not
manipulate it (they may), or that courts, legislatures, and rent-seeking
rightsholders play no purposeful, positivist role in copyright’s expansion (they
do). But doctrinal feedback is its own animal, an independent contributor to the
seemingly ever-expanding reach of the copyright entitlement. It does not
depend on developments in legislation or litigation, or on strategic behavior in
the marketplace. Rather, it emerges from seemingly innocent structural features
of copyright law and from sensible, prudent behavior on the part of everyone
involved. Whether we care as a normative matter about this phenomenon is
another question, which I will defer until after we examine the role of licensing
information in trademark and patent law.
II. TRADEMARK’S FEEDBACK LOOP
Like copyright law, trademark law has seen a steady expansion over the last
few decades, with new subject matters qualifying for its protection, more
conduct falling within its entitlements, and additional remedies becoming
available to its beneficiaries. Courts and legislatures are responsible for many of
these developments87 and have received the lion’s share of the attention in the
scholarship.88 Yet trademark’s growth is not just the result of formal changes in
the positive law. Instead, trademark licensing practices inform trademark law,
resulting in an expansive feedback loop rooted in the internal structure of
trademark doctrine.
Trademark’s doctrinal feedback occurs in three steps. First, courts consider
a mark infringed when its unlicensed use is likely to cause confusion among
consumers as to whether the mark owner produced, sponsored, or approved of
the goods. The definitions of sponsorship and approval, however, are
notoriously broad and ambiguous, making liability a significant possibility for
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 862 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). In
one case, the defendant vindicated an incidental use almost by accident, having mistakenly
thought that the use was licensed. Gordon v. Nextel, 345 F.3d 922, 926 (6th Cir. 2003)
(prevailing on de minimis grounds rather than fair use).
87. E.g., Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, PUB. L. NO. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985
(1996) (expanding scope of entitlement); Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, PUB. L. NO.
100-667, ' 132, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (same); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th
Cir. 1985) (recognizing trademark protection for product design).
88. E.g., Robert C. Denicola, Freedom To Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1667-68 (1999);
Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687
(1999); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367 (1999).
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any use of a mark from which consumers might infer acquiescence by the mark
owner. In other words, if consumers think that a given use of a mark requires a
license from the mark owner, then engaging in that use without a license
presents a real risk of liability.
Second, trademark users often seek licenses when none is needed.
Sometimes they do so because they are risk averse and do not want to take their
chances with trademark’s indeterminate doctrines and supracompensatory
remedies, much as we have seen in copyright law. Other times they seek
licenses not as a mere prophylactic measure, but as part of a mutually beneficial
promotional arrangement, like product placement in film and television. In the
end, however, the result is the same: licensing markets where none need exist.
Finally, to complete the loop, these licensing markets feed back into the
infringement analysis as consumers actively absorb the branding practices they
encounter in the marketplace and thus learn over time which trademark uses are
licensed. As we will see, a compelling body of empirical studies from the
behavioral sciencesCnever before cited in the trademark literatureCsuggests that
as consumers encounter more and more licensed uses and fewer and fewer
unlicensed uses, they will come to view licensing as the norm. And what
consumers view as the norm becomes the norm, because consumer perception is
trademark law’s touchstone.
The end result is that the gray areas of trademark law become less grayCor,
more accurately, shift toward uses that had once unquestionably been within the
public’s prerogative rather than the mark owner’s. This feedback effect is less
consistent and more attenuated than we saw in copyright, for reasons that will
soon become apparent. But it exists nonetheless, and like its copyright
counterpart it causes an accretive expansion the reach of trademark entitlements
with minimal contributions from courts, legislatures, and rent-seeking
rightsholders.
A. Trademark Doctrine
The prototypical trademark infringement case involves confusion as to the
source of the defendant’s goods. Suppose an upstart soft drink company uses
the “Pepsi” mark on its new cola. By doing so, the upstart passes off its product
as that of PepsiCo and confuses loyal Pepsi drinkers into buying its soda, rather
than the PepsiCo product they have come to know and love. Trademark law
evolved to give mark owners like PepsiCo a way to stop the upstart and thus to
prevent harm both to consumers (who are being deceived) and the mark owner
(whose sales are being diverted).
Confusion from passing off one producer’s product as that of another
represents trademark’s core concern, but actionable confusion can arise even
when consumers clearly understand that the product they are buying did not
originate with the mark owner. Modern trademark law forbids not only those
uses of a mark that are likely to confuse consumers as to the origin of goods, but
also any uses that are likely to cause confusion as to sponsorship or approval of
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the goods.89 The case law on sponsorship and approval, however, is so
ambiguous as to make it almost impossible to know ex ante whether a given use
will be infringing.90
The ambiguity begins with imprecise vocabulary. Courts use a variety of
synonymous and not-so-synonymous terms to describe the kind of confusion at
issue, from the federal Lanham Act’s sponsorship and approval terminology, to
whether the relationship between the parties is one of endorsement,91
affiliation,92 association,93 connection,94 authorization,95 permission,96 or
license,97 to whether the use produced confusion “of any kind.”98 Attached to
these descriptors comes a host of catch-all modifiers, selected precisely for their
imprecision: Was there confusion as to whether the mark owner “otherwise”
approved or was “in some other way” connected?99 Was there a relationship “of
some sort” or a suggestion that the defendant’s product emanated “in some way”

89. E.g., 15 U.S.C. ' 1125(a)(1) (prohibiting use of mark that “is likely to cause confusion,
or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of . . . goods,
services, or commercial activities”).
90. There are other sources of trademark indeterminacy as well, such as the ubiquitous
multi-factor test for likelihood of confusion, AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th
Cir. 1979), and the uncertain reach of dilution liability, see Lauren P. Smith, Note, Trademarks
and the Movies: “An Af-‘Fair Use’ To Remember,” 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 415 (2000).
91. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 544 (5th Cir. 1998); Boston
Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1989); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak,
836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987); Medic Alert Foundation U.S., Inc. v. Corel Corp., 43 F.
Supp. 2d 933, 937 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
92. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 543; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d
769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994); Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d at 398; Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,
287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 918 (C.D. Ill. 2003); Medic Alert, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 937.
93. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332 (2d Cir. 1983); Caterpillar,
287 F. Supp. 2d at 918; Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 240
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 873
(S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Schieffelin & Co., 850 F. Supp. at 247 (“mental association”).
94. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544; Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d at 774; Boston Athletic, 867
F.2d at 34; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d
Cir. 1979); NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (D. Del. 1977). Courts’ use of
“affiliation,” “association,” and “connection” may derive from language in the Lanham Act
regarding confusion “as to the affiliation, connection, or association” between the mark user and
“another person.” 15 U.S.C. ' 1125(a)(1)(A).
95. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 854-55 (7th Cir.
1982); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1981).
96. Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544; University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756
F.2d 1535, 1546 n.28 (11th Cir. 1985). But see Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544 n.10 (noting that
“approval” might have been better term than “permission”).
97. Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 28-29; Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 205.
98. Syntex Labs., Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1971).
99. Dallas Cowboys, 604 F.2d at 205; see also Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 28-29
(“otherwise” endorsed); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 398 (8th Cir. 1987)
(“otherwise” affiliated); Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co.,
676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982) (“other” association); Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F.
Supp. 2d 913, 918 (C.D. Ill. 2003) (“otherwise” affiliated); Medic Alert Foundation U.S., Inc. v.
Corel Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d 933, 937 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (“otherwise” affiliated).
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from the mark owner?100 Will consumers “in some fashion” associate the
plaintiff and defendant?101
The choice of terminology does not appear to be result-oriented; courts that
favor the defendant use broad language just as readily as courts that favor the
plaintiff.102 Rather, it seems designed to give courts the flexibility to reach an
equitable result despite substantial variation in the fact patterns they encounter.
Whether it accomplishes this goal is debatable, much like the question of
whether the equitable nature of the fair use doctrine leads to the correct outcome
in copyright disputes. As we will see, however, it has the effect of creating
substantial gray areas into which the risk-averse trademark user fears to tread.
The ambiguity in terminology leads to further ambiguity regarding the
proper focus of the confusion analysis. Under the Lanham Act, the confusion
must relate to whether the mark owner sponsored or approved the defendant’s
product.103 But as courts employ a variety of decreasingly analogous synonyms
for sponsorship and approval, the focus shifts from whether the plaintiff
sponsored or approved of the defendant’s product to whether the plaintiff
acquiesced in defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark.104 And some courts seem to
100. Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 240, 247 (S.D.N.Y.
1994); see also id. at 247 (“some” mental association); Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544 (“some”
connection); Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993) (“in some way”
related) (quoting James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274 (7th Cir.
1976)); Boston Athletic, 867 F.2d at 34 (“some” connection); Caterpillar, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 918
(“somehow” sponsored).
101. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 873 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
102. E.g., compare Just Did It, 6 F.3d at 1228 (reversing judgment for plaintiff regarding
confusion as to whether defendant’s product was “in some way related to, or connected or
affiliated with, or sponsored by” plaintiff) (quoting James Burrough, 540 F.2d at 274), and
Supreme Assembly, 676 F.2d at 1082 n.3, 1084 (affirming judgment for defendant regarding
confusion as to “connection” and whether defendant’s product “was in any way endorsed,
sponsored, approved or otherwise associated” with plaintiff), with Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing judgment for defendant and
ordering judgment for plaintiff regarding confusion as to whether defendant’s product was
“affiliated with, connected with, or sponsored by” plaintiff) (quoting 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION ' 24:03 (3d ed. 1992)), and Schieffelin,
850 F. Supp. at 247 (issuing preliminary injunction based on evidence of confusion as to
“association” with and “authorization” by plaintiff and whether defendant’s product “emanated
in some way” from and evoked “some mental association” with plaintiff).
103. The exact language refers to “confusion . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval
of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities.” 15 U.S.C. ' 1125(a)(1). Note that state
statutes may use other, more expansive terms, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. ' 10-1-372 (focusing on
confusion as to “affiliation, connection, or association with or certification by another”), and that
owners of federally registered marks can also proceed under a section of the Lanham Act that
contains no limits on the kinds of confusion it deems actionable but that focuses on mark uses
directly related to advertising, see 15 U.S.C. ' 1114(1).
104. E.g., Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 544 (“For a party to suggest to the public, through its
use of another’s mark or a similar mark, that it has received permission to use the mark on its
goods or services suggests approval, and even endorsement, of the party’s product or service and
is a kind of confusion the Lanham Act prohibits.”); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979) (“The public’s belief that the mark’s
owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trademark satisfies the confusion
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have jettisoned the confusion requirement altogether.105
Finally, the indeterminacy culminates in the use of surveys to assess
consumer reaction to a disputed use. Courts have come to expect and rely on
survey evidence as a matter of course, so much so that their absence is
sometimes held against the mark owner.106 Yet when it comes to confusion as
to sponsorship or approval, surveys rely on the same broad and ambiguous
collection of terms that courts use to define the kind of confusion at issue, from
whether the defendant’s product is “sponsored” or “authorized”107 to whether
the mark owner simply “goes along” with the use of the mark.108 Perhaps the
most popular survey asks the respondent to opine on whether “permission” was
required for the challenged use,109 which effectively takes consumers’
impressions of the relevant licensing culture and converts them into law.
Moreover, a mark owner can win its suit by showing a likelihood of confusion
among a surprisingly small percentage of the consuming publicCas low as ten
or fifteen percent.110
requirement.”).
105. E.g., Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989) (enjoining sale
of t-shirts that suggested link with Boston Marathon without requiring mark owner “to prove that
members of the public will actually conclude that defendants’ product was officially sponsored
by the Marathon’s sponsor (whoever that sponsor may be)”); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys,
Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 33 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding infringement from fact that consumers identified
defendant’s toy car with car from plaintiff’s television show “though there was no showing that
consumers believed that the toy cars marketed by [defendant] were sponsored or authorized by
[plaintiff]”).
106. 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, ' 32:195.
107. Processed Plastic Co. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 675 F.2d 852, 854-55 (7th Cir.
1982) (“sponsored or authorized”); Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp.
232, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (Aauthorization”); NFL Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc.,
532 F. Supp. 651, 661 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (“authorization or sponsorship”); NFL v. Governor of
Del., 435 F. Supp. at 1380-81 (“authorization”).
108. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1987).
109. Permission surveys have been instrumental in dozens of cases, see Jacob Jacoby, Sense
and Nonsense in Measuring Sponsorship Confusion 11-14 & nn.38-39 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law Law
& Econ. Working Paper No. 29, 2005), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu/lewp/papers/29, but
are based on deeply flawed assumptions about the behavior of the actors in the market and
grievously oversimplified interpretations of the law. On the factual front, they assume that no
business enterprise would seek a license unless the law required it, id. at 8-9, which we will see
is demonstrably untrue. On the legal front, they assume that intellectual property law is no
different from the law that governs realty and personalty, and that the public thus correctly
understands the proper scope of intellectual property rights, id. at 24-26Can argument so facile
that it requires no rebuttal. Cf. NFL Props., Inc. v. ProStyle, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1018-19
(E.D. Wis. 1998) (ruling permission survey inadmissible because it would “accord trademark
protection based upon the public’s mistaken notion of the law”); Major League Baseball Props.,
Inc. v. Sed Non Olet Denarius, Ltd., 817 F. Supp. 1103, 1122-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding
permission survey questions “leading” and “fatally flawed”), vacated, 859 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
110. E.g., Mut. of Omaha, 836 F.2d 397 (giving “substantial weight” to survey in which
“approximately ten percent of all the persons surveyed thought that [plaintiff] ‘goes along’ with
[defendant’s] product”); James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 278-79
(7th Cir. 1976) (reversing directed verdict when survey showed 15% of consumers were
confused as to plaintiff’s sponsorship); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v.
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In the end, then, surveys do little more than record consumers’ intuitions as
to what the law might require. Courts’ reliance on such surveys to define the
reach of the trademark entitlement thus amounts to a tautological endorsement
of whatever consumers believe the law is, or should be, regardless of whether
their beliefs make any sense from a policy standpoint. Instead of telling the
public what the law has to say about the legality of unlicensed trademark uses,
courts instead ask the public.
Thus we see that trademark doctrine opens itself up to the same circularity
that we saw in copyright law. The reach of the entitlement depends on
consumer perception. If that perception is formed at least in part by exposure to
licensing practices, then the law conflates premise and conclusion and invites
doctrinal feedback.111 To close this loop and show that it expands the
entitlement, however, we need two more ingredients: licensing markets where
none is needed, and a means of feeding that licensing information back into
consumer perception. I will consider each in turn.
B. Licensing Motivations
We have just seen that the boundaries of trademark rights, like their
copyright counterparts, are indeterminate. And like copyright law, trademark
law not only provides supracompensatory monetary remedies112 but also
strongly presumes that prevailing rightsholders deserve injunctions, both
preliminary and permanent.113 It should therefore come as no surprise when
trademark users who could mount a decent defense against an infringement
claim nevertheless choose to seek a license. This is particularly true for
moneyed, risk-averse actors like movie and television producers; from their
perspective, or that of their E&O insurer, it makes no difference whether the
court order that brings the project to a screeching halt originates in trademark
law or copyright law. Filmmakers accordingly approach trademark licensing as
conservatively as they approach copyright licensing,114 with “license, don’t
litigate” drilled into their heads starting in film school.115
Yet risk aversion and the fear of being sued provide only part of the
Steinway and Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding “strong evidence” of
likelihood of confusion where 7.7% of those surveyed “preceived [sic] a business connection”
between the parties and “8.5% confused the names”).
111. See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 102, ' 24:9; Denicola, supra note 88, at 1667-68; Stacey
L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54
EMORY L.J. 461, 485-86 (2005); Lemley, supra note 88, at 1708; Lunney, supra note 88, at 39697.
112. E.g., 15 U.S.C. '' 1114(1)(a), 1117.
113. E.g., Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084 (7th
Cir. 1988) (AAt the preliminary injunction stage, . . . a [trademark] plaintiff need only
demonstrate that he or she has a ‘better than negligible’ chance of succeeding on the merits to
justify injunctive relief.”); NFL Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651,
664 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (ordering permanent injunction in merchandising dispute as “the
standard remedy in unfair competition cases”).
114. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 20-21.
115. Id. at 18.
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explanation for the existence of unneeded trademark licenses. Mutually
advantageous business opportunities also create licensing markets.
Merchandising provides a good example. Consider Triangle Publications, Inc.
v. Rohrlich,116 one of the first cases to recognize the viability of a claim of
sponsorship confusion. Triangle Publications published Seventeen, the wellknown magazine for teenage girls. Rohrlich sold girdles under the trademark
“Miss Seventeen.”117 Triangle sued Rohrlich for trademark infringement.
Although Triangle was in the business of selling magazines, not clothing, the
Second Circuit placed great weight on the district court’s finding that the
“Seventeen” mark
had played an important part in the merchandising of teen-age apparel in
various ways, such as by conferences with manufacturers, editorial fashion
comments, sales to manufacturers and merchandisers of reprints, countercards and blow ups of its comments and of advertising, monthly bulletins
advising merchandisers how to tie in with forthcoming issues of the magazine,
and by aiding merchandisers in arranging window displays and departmental
displays.118

The court accordingly concluded that “the public was likely to attribute the use
of ‘Seventeen’ in connection with sales of teen-age merchandise to the plaintiff
as a source of sponsorship” and affirmed a judgment against Rohrlich.119 We
can infer that the merchandising relationships that were so important to the
case’s outcome came about not because the various manufacturers and
merchandisers engaged in merely prophylactic licensing, but because they
genuinely wanted to strike a symbiotic promotional deal with a popular
periodical.120
Similar promotional arrangements occur in the entertainment industry,
where producers strike “product placement” deals with mark ownersCnot
because they necessarily have to, as a legal matter, but because the deals
represent money-making opportunities. If our Cleveland documentarian is
worried about whether the appearance of the “Newsweek” mark in her film will
lead to sponsorship or approval liability, she can call Newsweek Inc. and offer
to pay a fee for a trademark license. But why not instead ask the mark owner to
pay her a fee? Manufacturers are increasingly arranging (and paying) for the
conspicuous use of their products or appearance of their logos in popular media.
A seven-second close up of Sunlight brand detergent on the sitcom Everybody

116. 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
117. Id. at 970.
118. Id. at 971.
119. Id. The holding technically rested on a finding of unfair competition; the court
declined to reach the trademark issue. Id. at 971.
120. A similar phenomenon may cause a feedback-fueled expansion of rights of privacy and
publicity at the expense of the public domain: authors and filmmakers who recount factual events
may strike a deal with those whom they depict, not because they fear litigation, but because “the
persons involved may have information that would otherwise be hard to find out and can serve a
promotional role .” DONALDSON, supra note 23, at 48 (noting that insurers may now insist on
such clearances).
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Loves Raymond cost over $20,000.121 On Friends, a lengthy product placement
for Snuggle fabric softener cost ten times that muchCbut for that price one of
the characters actually handled the package.122 In the late 1990s, product
placement routinely generated an estimated fifteen percent of Hollywood’s
feature film revenue, and more recent studies suggest the figure has risen to
twenty-five percent.123 For one recent James Bond film, MGM enlisted over
twenty marketing partners for a total of at least $100 million, $35 million of
which came from Ford Motor Company alone.124
In short, risk aversion and promotional opportunities combine to create
markets for trademark licenses where none is needed. As we will soon see,
these two different motivations for licensing have different implications for how
strong trademark’s feedback effect will be.
C. Persuasion Knowledge
We now have two of the three pieces of trademark’s feedback puzzle: an
ambiguous infringement doctrine that depends on consumer perception, and
unneeded licensing markets. Now we must connect the dots: the licensing
markets must cause consumer perception to change, so that perception feeds
back into doctrine.
This final step is the least intuitive, because trademark law tends to view
consumer perception as static and consumers as gullible dupes, helpless to deal
with even marginally confusing marketing practices. For example, an
unlicensed mark user can easily lose an infringement suit even when ninety
percent or more of the public is not confused by the use.125 And the case law
often views consumers as incapable of learning from past encounters with
trademarks. One line of cases holds that an Internet search engine cannot show
Toyota advertising when its users search for “Honda,” under the rationale that
consumers will blithely assume that advertisements accompanying search results
will relate only to the brand for which the search was conducted.126 These
holdings ignore the obvious: those who operate under that assumption will
quickly (and relatively costlessly) be disabused of it the first time they click on
such an ad and see only Toyota products, and will presumably adjust their
expectations thereafter so as not to be confused again.127
121. Louis Chunovic, Trying To Price Placement, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 2, 2002, at 4.
122. Id.
123. Kim Bartel Sheehan & Aibing Guo, “Leaving on a (Branded) Jet Place”: An
Exploration of Audience Attitudes Towards Product Assimilation in Television Content, J.
CURRENT ISS. & RES. IN ADVERTISING, Spring 2005, at 79, 80.
124. Jane Weaver, A License to Shill, MSNBC NEWS (June 16, 2003),
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3073513.
125. See sources cited supra note 110.
126. E.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir.
2004); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064
(D. Minn. Mar 20, 2006).
127. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on
the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 823 (2004).
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A compelling body of empirical studies from the behavioral sciencesCnever
before cited in the intellectual property scholarshipCteaches us that such
adjustments of consumer expectation are common. Consumers routinely
develop an awareness of the promotional nature of the marketing efforts that
bombard them and an ability to appreciate and manage their own reactions
thereto.128 This ability on the part of consumers, called “persuasion
knowledge,” should come as no surprise. The average consumer encounters
some three thousand brand names a day.129 That’s three thousand opportunities
for the consumer to learn about trademark practices.
When it comes to learning about sponsorship or approval, for example,
consumers cannot help but notice the proliferation of cross-promotional
arrangements in the mass media, where obviously unconnected enterprises
constantly associate with one another in a clearly “official” capacity. The Eddie
Bauer logo adorns the side of a Ford SUV. Xerox sponsors the Olympic
Games. A single television commercial advertises both the NBA playoffs and
the latest Hollywood blockbuster, incorporating and interspersing footage from
both. When consumers experience these promotional efforts, they draw certain
conclusions about the interaction of mark owners and the law that governs
sponsorship, and stand ready to apply that new persuasion knowledge to the
next marketing tool they encounter. Changes in licensing practices can
therefore effect changes in consumer perception. Any given analysis of how
consumers perceive a trademark useCfor example, a consumer survey, or a
court ruling that relies on such a surveyCrepresents a mere snapshot of a
moving target, whose perception may be quite different after new licensing
practices work their magic.130
The strength of trademark’s feedback effect accordingly depends on how
easy it is for consumers to acquire persuasion knowledge about trademark
practice. When consumers readily understand that a given use is licensed, the
entitlement will more easily and organically expand to include that sort of use.
When such an understanding is harder to come by, accretive expansion is
slower, or altogether absent. A review of trademark’s doctrinal feedback in the
film and television industry and the merchandising industry will demonstrate
this point.

128. For the foundational research, see Marian Friestad & Peter Wright, The Persuasion
Knowledge Model: How People Cope with Persuasion Attempts, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 1 (1994).
129. Michelle R. Nelson & Laurie Ellis McLeod, Adolescent Brand Consciousness and
Product Placements: Awareness Liking and Perceived Effects on Self and Others, 29 INT’L J.
CONSUMER STUD. 515, 516 (2005).
130. “All people are ‘moving targets’ whose knowledge about persuasion keeps changing,”
making it risky to “rely[] on subjects who are uniformly at any particular stage of persuasion
knowledge development.” Friestad & Wright, supra note 128, at 23.
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1. Film and Television
Suppose Aidan Auteur makes a film in which the hero chugs a can of Red
Bull energy drink. Would a consumer be confused as to whether the maker of
Red Bull sponsored the film? Maybe not. We might even say probably not.131
But as we have seen, the law is sufficiently ambiguous and Aidan sufficiently
risk averse that he may decide not to take any chances with his investment. He
will either forgo the use of the brand-name product or get a license from the
mark owner. As it happens, each of these options affects the persuasion
knowledge consumers will acquire about trademark practices in the film
industry. If he simply substitutes a glass of water or some fictional brand for the
Red Bull, viewers might never notice and would thus acquire little persuasion
knowledge about the trademark considerations that guided his decision.
Likewise, if he secures a license to use the brand, but its use remains incidental
and inconspicuous, then consumers will again draw few conclusions from its
appearance. These options therefore suggest a weak feedback effectCalthough
even in these two cases some persuasion knowledge results: if other filmmakers
follow suit, recognizable brands will only rarely be prominently featured in
movies and will consequently be more noticeable to the public when they do.
Aidan’s remaining two options affect consumer perception more directly
and thus produce stronger feedback. First, suppose he uses digital pixels to blur
the image of the can so that the Red Bull brand is not recognizable (an
increasingly common and accessible practice, particularly in “reality” television
and documentaries).132 Such pixelation sends a strong signal to viewers that
131. On this precise point, the case law favors unlicensed use. In 2003, the owner of the
well-known “Caterpillar” mark for earth-moving equipment lost a motion for a temporary
restraining order against Disney’s release of George of the Jungle 2, in which Caterpillar
bulldozers were shown poised to wreak environmental havoc on George’s beloved Ape
Mountain. Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 916-18 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
Although the court that Caterpillar had a “slightly more than negligible likelihood of success” on
its confusion claim, id. at 920, that was not enough to outweigh the harm to Disney that would
result from issuance of the order, id. at 923. That said, the court indicated that its holding might
change as licensing practices change: “Part of what drives the Court’s discomfort with
Caterpillar’s position is the fact that the [unlicensed] appearance of products bearing well known
trademarks in cinema and television is a common phenomenon.” Id. at 919. And there is
sufficient contrary precedent to render the issue ambiguous: one of the best-known and most
expansive sponsorship cases held that trademark law forbade the unlicensed use of an NFL
cheerleading uniform in the pornographic film Debbie Does Dallas, although that ruling also
focused on the use of the uniform in the film’s promotion. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming preliminary injunction).
Experienced trademark counsel will also notice that Caterpillar failed to conduct the allimportant consumer surveyCa mistake not likely to be repeated in the latest challenge to an
unlicensed use of a mark in a Disney films, this one from the Hell’s Angels. Hells Angels Sue
Disney on Planned Movie, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at C4. Indeed, the fact that Caterpillar
even bothered to bring suit may be more significant than the fact that it lost.
132. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 21 (quoting filmmaker for proposition that “[y]ou
see everything being blurred now, because for the first time, we’re able to do that technically
without it being a big deal”). Reality television has also proved to be a favorite locus for Aidan’s
other option, product placement. Amanda Bronstad, Paying for a Place, NAT’L L.J., May 1,
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trademarks have some special legal statusCi.e., that filmmakers are not free to
use them as they pleaseCbecause viewers cannot help but notice that a brand
has been blurred.133
Second, suppose he secures a license as part of a product placement deal
with the owner of the Red Bull mark. Such product placement may have once
been a clandestine form of marketing whose effectiveness depended on its
ability to promote a product to consumers when their usual skeptical defenses
against advertising were down.134 But persuasion knowledge studies in the last
fifteen years repeatedly show that consumers have become more sophisticated in
interpreting product placement; they have grown aware of the practice and are
adjusting their attitudes as “active interpreters, not passive receptors of
encountered brands.”135 Hollywood has adapted as well, making crosspromotion something it trumpets rather than hides.136 Hit films like The Truman
Show and Wayne’s World even satirize the (formerly) manipulative nature of
product placement with jokes that assume audience familiarity with the
practice.137 In short, today’s audiences have learned to view branded products
in movies and television programs as more than mere incidental props, and are
more likely to assume that prominently featured brands are licensed by the mark
owner.
Thus doctrinal feedback is born. Risk aversion and product placement lead
to more licensing and less depiction of unlicensed brands. Viewers pick up on
at least some of these practices, such as increasingly obvious placements and
eye-catching pixelated images. Over time, then, consumers come to see
2006, at 1, 18.
133. Cf. Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Point of View and Perceptions of Causality,
32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 439, 445 (1975) (explaining strong tendency to draw causal
inferences from information to which one’s attention is drawn).
134. Friestad & Wright, supra note 128, at 14; Nelson & McLeod, supra note 129, at 516.
135. Denise E. DeLorme & Leonard N. Reid, Moviegoers’ Experiences and Interpretations
of Brands in Films Revisited, J. ADVERTISING, Summer 1999, at 71, 85; see also id. at 78
(observing that moviegoers in study “were aware of the persuasive intent of brand props”), 85
(“Our results convincingly demonstrate that moviegoers are more sophisticated in their
understanding of the practice of brand placement than critics would have public policy officials
believe.”); Israel D. Nebenzahl & Eugene Secunda, Consumers’ Attitudes Toward Product
Placement in Movies, 21 INT’L J. ADVERTISING 1, 5-6 (1993) (reporting that college students are
neutral on whether product placement is unethical and that only 6.7% view it as misleading);
Sheehan & Guo, supra note 123, at 83 (noting that “audiences grow more aware of product
placement given its explicit presence in the content, and may develop attitudes toward the
practice”); Michelle Nelson & Mark Rademacher, How Media Create Persuasion Knowledge:
An Analysis of Product Placement Coverage in Trade and Newspaper Print Media 16 (Feb. 15,
2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (noting that media coverage twenty years
ago was likely to focus on the “newness” of product placement whereas more recent coverage
assumes that readers “are familiar with the practice”); cf. Paul Siegel, Product Placement and the
Law, in HANDBOOK OF PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE MASS MEDIA 89, 97 (Mary-Lou Galician ed.,
2004) (noting that product placements ma have been clandestine fifteen years ago “[b]ut
nowadays, audiences are keenly aware of their existence”).
136. Debra Goldman, Wheels of Fortune, ADWEEK, Apr. 14, 1997, at 62; Sheehan & Guo at
80.
137. Siegel, supra note 135, at 97.
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licensing as the norm: if a brand appears in a film, its owner must have
consented. Indeed, some forty-three percent of consumers already regard the
appearance of a branded product in a television program as an attempt to
influence the product’s purchase.138 Those giving advice to the major players in
film and television recognize that this persuasion knowledge implies broader
trademark rights and act accordingly. For example, MTV long-form
programming policy requires pixelation of any prominently featured brand that
is not part of a product placement deal, so that viewers will not mistakenly think
that it isCa policy that the network’s intellectual property counsel admits is
“based largely on a business decision to avoid a risk of claim/litigation and not a
concrete belief that it’s illegal.”139 Such conservative licensing practices,
prudent as they may be, push trademark’s entitlement even further into
previously unregulated territory.
2. Merchandising
The considerable growth of trademark’s reach in the merchandising industry
over the last thirty years provides another opportunity to study the role of
persuasion knowledge in doctrinal feedback. Licensing trademarks for use on
clothing, keychains, coffee cups, and other assorted merchandise is a multibillion-dollar business. Yet a mark owner’s right to demand payment for use of
its mark on such goods is of recent vintage and arises from a series of
ambiguous rulings.140
The earliest of those rulings looked to licensing evidence in deciding
whether the mark owner controlled the merchandising market. For example, the
first litigation victories for sports merchandising came about because the NFL
and NHL had each given one manufacturer an exclusive license to make
embroidered team logos. When unlicensed companies began to sell the same
product, the leagues sued.141 In each case, the court attached considerable
significance to the fact that the leagues had already created and exploited a
market for exclusive licenses, such that consumers would be confused by
unlicensed uses142Can implicit recognition that consumers had internalized the
licensing practices in that industry. Thus those markets that prominently
featured “official” merchandise and that did not have a tradition of unlicensed
competition were fertile ground for claims that all goods bearing a trademark
had to be licensed.143
138. Dawn Anfuso, Survey Says: TV Ads Not Dead, IMEDIA CONNECTION, Aug. 22, 2005, at
http://www.imediaconnection.com/news/6577.asp (last viewed Feb. 13, 2006).
139. E-mail from Vate Powell, Vice President and Senior Counsel for Intellectual Property
and Litigation, MTV Networks, to James Gibson, Director of Intellectual Property Institute and
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law (June 26-27, 2006) (on file
with author). Powell also believes that this is “an industry practice and not just ours.” Id.
140. See generally Dogan & Lemley, supra note 111.
141. Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th
Cir. 1975); NFL Props., Inc. v. Consumer Enters., Inc., 327 N.E.2d 242 (Ill. App. 1975).
142. Boston Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1011; Consumer Enters., 327 N.E.2d at 246.
143. As one court reluctantly concluded, “Apparently, in this day and age when professional
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The earliest cases to reject a merchandising claim applied the same principle
(or, more precisely, its inverse). Here, the mark owners’ failure to show that the
market for college paraphernalia and fraternal merchandise was exclusive to
their licensees doomed their claims. The absence of such a market meant that
consumers were accustomed to encountering unlicensed merchandise and thus
would not mistakenly infer any relationship between the merchandise
manufacturer and the mark owner simply by virtue of the mark’s appearance on
a product.144 Again, the importance of persuasion knowledge was clear:
consumers had learned from the lack of exclusive licensing in those industries
and formed their expectations accordingly.
Despite their restrictive holdings, however, the courts that rejected early
merchandising claims created the potential for a feedback-fueled expansion of
the trademark entitlement. They used broad and vague definitions of actionable
confusion, thereby creating uncertainty as to how far outside their facts the
holding applied.145 And their narrow rulings often based the rejection of broad
merchandising rights on the absence of any formal testing of consumer reaction
to the disputed use, which invited the use of that insidious and circular
instrument of trademark expansion, the consumer survey.146 Within these
decisions therefore lurked the danger that the trademark entitlement would move
further into the merchandising realm, beyond where the case law
indicatedCeven without any more court rulings or other positivist developments.
Exclusive licensing might initially be uncommon in a given market, but over
time that could easily change, and consumer perception would change with it.
The shift might begin with symbiotic licensing, as when a merchandiser sees
value in becoming an “official” licensee. Other merchandisers might then
license prophylactically, having recognized the ambiguity of the legal standards
sports teams franchise pennants, teeshirts, helmets, drinking glasses and a wide range of other
products, a substantial number of people believe, if not told otherwise, that one cannot conduct
[a state lottery based on NFL games] without NFL approval.” NFL v. Governor of Del., 435 F.
Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1977); see also NFL Props., Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc.,
532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (enjoining unlicensed NFL jerseys); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (affirming preliminary
injunction against use of Dallas Cowboys cheerleaders uniform in adult film); cf. Boston Athletic
Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989) (ordering summary judgment against maker of tshirts that suggested connection with Boston Marathon).
144. Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d
1079, 1083 (5th Cir. 1982) (fraternal merchandise); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg
and Co., 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); Board of Governors of the University of
North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (college merchandise);
University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 711, 716 (W.D. Pa. 1983)
(same). But see University of Georgia Athletic Ass’n v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985)
(finding infringement from use of university mascot on beer).
145. E.g., Supreme Assembly, 676 F.2d at 1082-83 & n.3 (speaking of confusion as to
source, endorsement, sponsorship, connection, approval, or “other association”); University of
Pittsburgh, 566 F. Supp. at 713 (looking for confusion as to “origin, sponsorship, endorsement,
or any other nature”).
146. E.g., Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. at 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (suggesting that survey like
that in Wichita Falls would have helped mark owner’s case); University of Pittsburgh, 566 F.
Supp. at 720 (same).
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and the risk of an adverse judgment (a risk that would only increase as more
symbiotic licensing occurred). Eventually, as consumers encountered more
“official” licensed merchandise and less unlicensed merchandise, they would
increasingly come to believe that the law required a license for the use of a mark
on a given good. This new persuasion knowledge would then work its way back
into trademark practice through the law’s use of consumer perception to define
the entitlement’s reach.
Thus a feedback effect that got its start through purely voluntary, mutually
beneficial licensing agreements would pick up speed and extend the reach of the
entitlement into the sphere of those who would prefer to compete with, not
contract with, the mark owner. We saw this feedback effect in the Triangle
Publications decision discussed above, in which the unlicensed defendant found
himself stymied by licensing practices that others had eagerly created as part of
merchandising deals with Seventeen magazine.147 We have also seen that
feedback was responsible for the first incursions of exclusive rights into the
realm of professional sports merchandise; the NFL’s and NHL’s success in
persuading some merchandisers to seek licenses is what ensured their victories
in subsequent litigation against others.
In Triangle Publications and the professional sports cases, we can point to
feedback as the culprit with some certainty because courts explicitly cited these
licensing markets in crafting their expansive rulings. The more difficult
question is whether we can detect doctrinal feedback that never circles back
around into the positive law. The development of a vibrant merchandising
industry suggests that the answer is yes. Few merchandising cases have been
decided since the initial wave discussed above. One statutory change has
occurred at the federal level (“sponsorship” and “approval” were added to
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act about a dozen years after the first
merchandising rulings148), yet this amendment simply codified established case
law and thus made little difference to positive law as a whole.149 Yet despite
this relative stasis in the positive law, collegesCwhose attempts to establish
merchandising exclusivity in court were largely rejectedCnow oversee a billiondollar licensing market.150 Indeed, merchandising exclusivity is so widely
accepted today that police routinely raid unlicensed merchandisers and
“trademark owners, retail businesses, and even government officials simply
assume the existence of such a right.”151 Scholars have been at a loss to explain
these developments.152 If the law has not changed, what has? The answer, I
147. See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
148. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, PUB. L. NO. 100-667, ' 132, 102 Stat. 3935,
3946 (amending 15 U.S.C. ' 43(a)).
149. Lunney, supra note 88, at 474 & n.353.
150. 1 GREGORY J. BATTERSBY & CHARLES W. GRIMES, THE LAW OF MERCHANDISE AND
CHARACTER LICENSING ' 2:16 (2005).
151. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 111, at 478.
152. E.g., id. (“The fact that courts are at best evenly split as to whether a merchandising
right even existsCand even more dubious of its existence in the absence of consumer
confusionCmakes it all the more surprising that trademark owners, retail businesses, and even
government officials simply assume the existence of such a right.”) (footnote omitted).
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submit, is that symbiotic licensing and prophylactic licensing both naturally
develop in merchandising marketsCthe former driven by promotional
opportunities and the latter by risk aversion and the indeterminacy of
infringement’s reach. Consumer persuasion knowledge develops apace, and as
consumers develop expectations more favorable to expansive merchandising
rights, mark users have even more reason to seek licenses, which in turn fuels
more expansion, and so on.
D. Limitations on Trademark’s Feedback
Although I hope to have convinced readers by now that doctrinal feedback
plays a significant and unappreciated part in the expansion of trademark
entitlements, the phenomenon comes with some caveats. In this final trademark
section, I discuss these caveats and explain why they will not ultimately curtail
trademark’s accretive growth.
I begin with the limitations of the persuasion knowledge model. Recall that
trademark doctrine, unlike copyright doctrine, does not refer directly to
licensing markets; rather, licensing informs doctrine only through the admittedly
hazy filter of consumer perception. The persuasion knowledge model explains
how consumers come to understand and internalize the licensing practices they
encounter. It therefore constitutes a vital part of the feedback loop.
As we have seen, however, certain licensing practices are easier for the
consumer to observe and absorb than others, and it is hard to predict with any
consistency when and how consumers will become aware of licenses in the first
place, let alone whether that awareness will translate into expansive impressions
of trademark’s reach. For example, consumers who encounter a Lakers
sweatshirt with a prominent “Official NBA Product” label might not notice the
label at all and thus gain no persuasion knowledge from it. Of those who do
notice, some might infer from the label that a license is necessary to produce
branded merchandiseCan inference that could fuel accretive expansion. On the
other hand, other consumers might infer that the label means that the market
includes unofficial gear tooCotherwise, why would the distinction be made?
That inference would militate against accretive expansion. Likewise, a riskaverse filmmaker may choose to pixelate an unlicensed mark or reach a product
placement deal to feature it prominently; either use conspicuously implies
licensing rules that consumers could easily internalize. But if the filmmaker
instead relegates the mark to the background or forgoes its use entirely,
consumers are not likely to gain much persuasion knowledge. We should
therefore expect accretive expansion of trademark entitlements to be more
halting and sporadic than its copyright counterpart.
Another problem with using the persuasion knowledge model to connect
licensing practices to consumer perception is that consumers acquire persuasion
knowledge from sources other than the licensing they encounter. In one 1983
poll, 91.2% of respondents agreed that “[n]o product can bear the name of an
entertainer, cartoon character, or some other famous person unless permission is
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given for its use by the owner of the name or character”153Can impression that is
hard to explain based purely on the licensing practices of the time. Likewise,
consumers learn about product placement from repeated exposure to it, but they
also learn from media coverage of the practice, which has increased over the last
twenty years.154 These extrinsic sources of persuasion knowledge will make
little difference if they simply reinforce the impressions that consumers get from
licensing practices. But if they overstate the prevalence of licensing, they may
increase the feedback effectCcausing a growth in the entitlement that is neither
internal to trademark doctrine nor predictive of future expansion. If they
understate it, they may slow feedback down, or even cause accretive contraction
of entitlements.
Another potential wrench in feedback’s gears is the fact that trademark
licensing is only partly responsive to trademark doctrine. Product placement
deals and the symbiotic licensing we saw in merchandising cases arise not
because of worries about trademark liability, but because both parties see value
in cross-promotion. There is accordingly no guarantee that such licensing will
arise in any given marketCand without licensing, there is no feedback. Even
prophylactic licensing, which is rooted in fear of liability, may not be as strong
in trademark as in copyright. Someone selling knock-off Lakers jerseys has
lower costs than the filmmaker who wants to excerpt four lines from a
Springsteen song, and in any event is more likely to be a somewhat shady
character with a high internal discount rate.155 He or she will therefore be more
willing to roll the dice and risk litigation.
This does not mean that trademark experiences no doctrinal
feedbackCtrademark users like our filmmaker will be risk averse, and even a
risk-neutral actor may choose to seek a license in the face of considerable legal
ambiguitiesCbut its effect may be less widespread and more attenuated in
industries that lack strong risk aversion. We can expect feedback in such
industries to be particularly dependent on developments in the positive law,
because the absence of risk aversion means that a licensing culture is unlikely to
spontaneously arise without an apposite and expansive court ruling or statute.
Such dependence would not curtail the feedback effect, but it would make it less
insidious and more like the positivist entitlement expansions on which the
scholarship usually focuses.156
153. Stephen H. Harrison, The Merchandising Reporter’s First Consumers Survey on
Licensing, MERCHANDISING REP., Aug. 1983, at 22, 23-25. The survey results demonstrate the
potential for a feedback-fueled expansion of trademark’s cousin, the right of publicity.
154. Nelson & Rademacher, supra note 135.
155. See James Cyphers, Companies Join Police in Pursuing T-Shirt Bootleggers, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 4, 1991, at B2 (“The T-shirts are cheap to make, the stolen trademarks are free and the
risk of getting caught is still low.”).
156. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 88, at 1697-1705 (discussing the role of positive law in
trademark’s “doctrinal creep”). The positive law might also be an additional source of
persuasion knowledge, but the average consumer is undoubtedly more likely to feel the effects of
court decisions and new legislation through exposure to updated licensing practices than through
hearing about them directly. But see Denicola, supra note 88, at 1667-68 (arguing that
trademark’s “self-actuated expansion” results from “trademark owners who win enough
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Finally, even if trademark law contains the seeds of its own expansion, the
skeptic might argue that another extrinsic influence, the First Amendment, will
prevent courts from extending the reach of the entitlement, particularly when it
affects the expressive decisions of filmmakers and other artists. This is possible,
but far from certain. Although trademark law is essentially the regulation of
expression, it has traditionally withstood constitutional scrutiny because its
regulations apply only when consumers are deceived, and the First Amendment
permits regulation of deceitful speech (e.g., perjury and fraud).157 The Second
Circuit, for example, gave constitutional concerns short shrift when it affirmed
an orderCa prior restraintCbarring release of the defendant’s film: “The
propriety of a preliminary injunction where [protection of trademark’s property
right] is sought is so clear that courts have often issued an injunction without
even mentioning the first amendment.”158 Given this precedent, the malleable
definition of actionable confusion, and the low evidentiary threshold for survey
proof, the First Amendment is not a reliable obstacle to the accretive expansion
of trademark rights in film and television content.159
If the First Amendment does not halt the intrusion of trademark into popular
culture, that intrusion has the potential to fuel feedback in other settings as well.
Film and television represent the public’s primary interaction with trademarks
outside their traditional role as mere indicators of origin. The persuasion
knowledge consumers acquire from mass media and its risk-averse, promotionminded actors will therefore disproportionately inform their perception of
trademark rights in broader contexts. Already sixty-five percent of magazine
readers think that editorial mentions of a brand are the result of a deal between
the mark owner and the magazine.160 And product placement is creeping into
videogames,161 rap music,162 and even novels.163 The practice has even sparked
a guerilla movement of sorts that encourages the negative depiction of brands as
high-profile cases or brag loudly enough about licensing revenues from ornamental use”).
157. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 160-64.
158. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d
Cir. 1979).
159. Contrast this with dilution theory, which is often cited as trademark’s greatest threat to
free expression and autonomy. E.g., Denicola, supra note 157, at 195-206 (focusing on dilution
by tarnishment); see also Smith, supra note 90 (arguing that dilution law already gives trademark
owners too much control over use of branded products in film). Trademark dilution, however,
does not require proof of consumer confusion and thus is more vulnerable to First Amendment
attack. The accretive, confusion-based expansion I describe may therefore be more threatening
to expressive freedom than the positive law of dilution.
160. The Week, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 17, 2005, at 20 (Sheila Dougherty ed.).
161. Mike Musgrove, Advertisers Are Getting Into the Game, WASH. POST., Mar. 2, 2006, at
D1.
162. Krissah Williams, In Hip-Hop, Making Name-Dropping Pay, WASH. POST., Aug. 29,
2005, at D1; Hank Kim, Def Jam, H-P Explore Branded Music Alliance, ADVERTISING AGE,
Sept. 9, 2002, at 4.
163. Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films
into Commercial Speech, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 308 (discussing the pre-arranged appearance
of a Maserati in the novel Power City).
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a way of resisting the reach of intellectual property rights.164
In short, despite the preceding caveats, mark owners’ control over use of
marks in popular culture and elsewhere is likely to grow. We begin with virgin
territory, in which those who choose to enter into symbiotic promotional deals
with mark owners coexist peacefully with those who opted instead for
unlicensed uses. But as licensing deals and pixelated brands become more
pervasive and more apparent to consumers, what was once a voluntary
relationship between mark owner and user begins to shift. Consumers draw
more inferences from the appearance of brands, and their inferences then feed
back into the legal calculus in which practitioners engage when deciding
whether to license. In the end, mark users will have to pay fees to mark owners
without getting anything out of it but the “right” to use the branded goodCa
“right” for which a license was never needed before.
III. PATENT’S SHORT CIRCUIT
Like copyright and trademark, patent is home to legal ambiguities, risk
aversion, costly litigation, severe penalties, and a doctrine that looks to the
existence vel non of licensing markets in defining entitlements. Yet because of
the manner in which these factors interact, and because of courts’ sensitivity to
their interaction, they do not produce systemic accretion of rightsCdespite the
fact that unnecessary licensing does take place. I will therefore spend only a
short time examining doctrinal feedback in patent law, lingering just long
enough to learn how licensing information can contribute to intellectual property
doctrine without causing an accretive expansion of rights.
The ambiguities that lead to unnecessary patent licenses occur both when
the law decides whether a patent exists at all and when the law defines the reach
of a patent. Take the latter first. Every patent concludes with one or more
claims. Each claim comprises a single sentence that precisely states the
exclusive right that the patent conveys.165 The idea here is the very opposite of
ambiguity: the Patent Act requires claims because the patentee and the public
both need to know precisely where the patent rights begin and end.166
Unfortunately, in practice the task of claim construction is rife with ambiguity.
First, reducing a technological concept to words is a chancy thing; the available
terminology may fail to capture the true nature of the innovation.167 Second,
courts interpret claims based not on their plain English meaning, but on the
meaning they would have to a person having ordinary skill in the art (a
“PHOSITA”)Ci.e., the typical worker in the relevant field.168 Such a
164. RTMARK Projects, Product Disadvertisements in TV and Movies,
http://www.rtmark.com/projects/app/disp (last visited June 7, 2006) (suggesting funding for
“product displacement” portrayals in which “[t]he FedEx package arrives late and mangled” or
“someone throws up after eating at McDonald’s”).
165. 35 U.S.C. ' 112.
166. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 (2002).
167. Id. at 731.
168. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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perspective can be difficult to tease out. Third, even if the wording manages to
capture the invention and the PHOSITA’s interpretation is clear, patent’s
doctrine of equivalents allows a patent owner to reach beyond the literal
boundaries of a claim to recover from those whose invention operates
substantially the same way to achieve the same result.169 Like copyright’s fair
use doctrine and substantial similarity standard, the doctrine of equivalents quite
reasonably sacrifices bright-line precision for flexibility and fairness.170 But in
combination with the challenges of terminology and PHOSITA perspective, it
frequently makes the reach of patent entitlements inherently ambiguous.171
Ambiguity is also found in the threshold determination of whether a given
invention is patentable. The Patent Act grants its protection only to inventions
that are novel, useful, and nonobvious.172 Of the various sources of
indeterminacy in this inquiry, the one of interest here is nonobviousness, which
is widely acknowledged as the most frequent basis for invalidation of
patents173Cand which, as we will soon see, is the factor that invites licensing
information into the picture.
The question in nonobviousness analysis is whether the innovation would
have been obvious to a PHOSITA given the state of the art at the time of
invention.174 The primary focus is therefore the content of the prior art, the
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of
ordinary skill in the relevant art.175 The Supreme Court has indicated, however,
that secondary considerations such as the invention’s commercial success may
also be relevant to whether the invention was indeed obvious.176 Such
considerations are helpful because they tend to be less technical than inquiries
into prior art and are also less susceptible to hindsight bias (an invention
naturally seems more obvious after it has been invented).177
The role of secondary considerations is not entirely clear. The Supreme
Court has merely held that they “might” be relevant,178 and has subsequently
implied that they cannot save a patent that otherwise appears obvious under the
three explicit statutory factors.179 Yet the Federal Circuit has expressly elevated
their importance, requiring their examination in all cases,180 observing that they
169. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
170. Festo, 535 U.S. at 731-33.
171. See R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1105 (2004) (finding
inconsistency in claim construction); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal
Circuit’s Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075 (2001) (same).
172. 35 U.S.C. '' 101 (useful), 102 (novel), 103 (nonobvious).
173. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 (1998).
174. 35 U.S.C. ' 103(a).
175. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
176. Id. at 17-18.
177. Id. at 35-36.
178. Id. at 17-18.
179. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S.
219, 230 n.4 (1976).
180. Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re
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“may often be the most probative and cogent evidence in the record,”181 and
using them to rescue patents that were “otherwise doubtful.”182
The nonobviousness analysis and the secondary considerations that inform
it are important for our purposes because one of those considerations is whether
the patent owner has successfully licensed the invention to others in the
industry. If so, the argument goes, they must view the patent as valid;
otherwise, they would make use of the innovation without bothering to seek a
license. And if those in the industry respect the patent’s validity, how can a
court conclude that it would have been obvious to a PHOSITA?183
By now, the flaws in this reasoning and its potential for accretive feedback
should be apparent. We have already seen that parties often agree to pay for
copyright and trademark licenses even if they sincerely doubt that they are
infringing. The same is true in patent. Patent infringement litigation is
notoriously costly, ranging from two to five times as expensive as copyright and
trademark suits with similar amounts at stake.184 Moreover, like copyright and
trademark, patent has traditionally been a property-rule regime, with
supracompensatory damages and injunctions readily available to the prevailing
rightsholder.185 This means that parties on the fringes of infringement will often
agree to license even if the reach of the claims or merits of the patent are in
doubt. The alternative is to take the chance of costly litigation, an adverse
judgment, damages in excess of what a license would have cost, and particularly
the disproportionate leverage that an injunction gives the rightsholderCa
threatening prospect, particularly when the patented technology constitutes but
one small component of the infringing product. Defendants with substantial
investments already committed are unlikely take that chance; they will tend
instead toward risk aversion.186
Yet despite these similarities to copyright and trademark licensing, doctrinal
feedback in patent law exists only in a very limited form and does not lead to a
systemic expansion of patent’s reach. This lack of accretive growth results from
two factors. First, any feedback from licensing information affects only the
particular patent being litigated. The fact that a risk-averse party may have
secured an unneeded license for Patent X may make it easier for the owner of
Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
181. Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538; accord Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories,
Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 306 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
182. Sernaker, 702 F.2d at 996; accord Stratoflex, 713 F.2d at 1538.
183. See, e.g., WMS Gaming, Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir.
1999) (citing licensing as evidence of “industry respect”).
184. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 2005 ECONOMIC SURVEY 22
(2005).
185. 35 U.S.C. ' 284 (allowing treble damages); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 842
F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (favoring injunctions). A recent Supreme Court ruling has,
however, cast doubt on how easily injunctions will issue. See infra notes 231-232 and
accompanying text (discussing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006)).
186. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 867-68 & n.260 (1988) (noting that risk
aversion may cause patent user to agree to pay more for license than an objective cost/benefit
analysis would suggest).
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Patent X to stave off an obviousness finding, but it has no effect on whether
some unrelated Patent Y is adjudged valid. Doctrinal feedback in patent law
will therefore not expand the reach of the patent entitlement in general. In
contrast, if the owner of a copyright in a photograph succeeds in convincing
documentarians to seek a license before using the photo in their films, that
licensing market is relevant to every subsequent fair use dispute between
photographers and filmmakers, and accordingly has an accretive effect on the
overall reach of copyright rights.
Second, and more important for our purposes, courts adjudicating patent
disputes routinely recognize and account for the possibility that licensing means
something other than respect for a patent’s validity. Even those cases that attach
primary importance to secondary considerations require the plaintiff to prove a
nexus between the licensing evidence and the merits of the claimed invention;187
courts understand that patent users might prefer to license rather than litigate
even a dubious patent, and that patent owners too might opt for a token fee
instead of a lawsuit in which their patent could be invalidated.188 As we will
now see, those who view accretive expansion as something to be avoided can
import this heightened scrutiny into copyright and trademark law and thus shortcircuit their feedback loops, just as patent already short-circuits its own.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. Do We Care?
To this point, I have merely described the feedback phenomenon and the
effects that it has on the reach of intellectual property entitlements. I will now
turn to the normative questions: do we care? Is accretive expansion of
intellectual property rights a problem? If so, what are the possible solutions?
At first blush, one might be tempted to view doctrinal feedback as benign.
Why would one object to markets that form from voluntary transactions or to
legal doctrines that measure liability by reference to industry practice? As
already noted, commentators from otherwise incompatible camps agree that
copyright’s fair use doctrine should refer to such practices when defining the
reach of the entitlement.189
Even among independent documentary
filmmakersCa community that seems much more likely to be victim than victor
in the permissions warsCthere is appreciable support for a pro-licensing
norm.190
Likewise, trademark’s consumer confusion standard enjoys
widespread acceptance, even if courts do occasionally give it too broad an
interpretation. If these reasonable doctrines combine with voluntary exchanges
187. E.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins & Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 305-06 &
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
188. I am indebted to Kristen Osenga for pointing out this risk aversion on patent owners’
part.
189. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
190. AUFDERHEIDE & JASZI, supra note 28, at 22-25.
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in the free market to produce an expansion of intellectual property rights,
perhaps that means that rights should expand.
No matter what one’s perspective on intellectual property, however, viewing
doctrinal feedback in this way is overly simplistic. Take the economic approach
to intellectual property law, which we might expect to be particularly deferential
to licensing markets. A licensing culture that results from risk aversion on the
part of the licensee and invites strategic holdout on the part of the licensor is
unlikely to promote overall social welfare, even if the licensing motivations are
economically rational from the individual parties’ standpoint.191 A market
formed in the shadow of legal ambiguities, risk-averse actors, and strategic
bargaining thus tells us little about the entitlement’s optimal coverage.
Moreover, because intellectual property goods are nonrival, exclusive rights are
not necessary to ensure that the goods gravitate to their most valuable use;
instead, exclusive rights merely to provide an incentive to produce the goods in
the first place.192 On that point, it is doubtful that the marginal, gray-area
licensing that causes doctrinal feedback has a significant incentivizing effect;
trademark owners have a considerable incentive to produce and popularize their
marks for source-identification purposes alone, and the incidental uses that fall
within fair use’s gray area are unlikely to represent a primary revenue stream for
copyright owners. Finally, even if licensing fees are important for incentive
purposes, the economic approach must recognize that information is both an
input and an output in the creative process.193 Thus the more licenses an artist
needs to produce a new work, the more likely he or she is to abandon the
enterprise entirely.194 The aggregate effect of a licensing culture may therefore
be an anticommons, with the incentive to produce newer works unduly
sacrificed at the altar of rewarding older works.
For those who view intellectual property as something other than a servant
of market efficiency, the analysis is different but the outcome is the same. In
copyright, for example, Wendy Gordon has argued that sometimes “the criteria
that perfect markets maximize are simply not the criteria of most importance.”195
And numerous commentators have observed that trademarks frequently assume
a role in popular rhetoric that has little to do with the cost-lowering, sourceidentifying function for which the law provides protection.196
191. Cf. Gordon, Excuse, supra note 56, at 167 (“Assuming the goal of copyright is to
achieve maximum social benefit, there is no reason to require a potential user of a work to ask
the copyright owner’s permission unless there is some way to believe the owner’s self-interest is
aligned with society’s.”).
192. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 12-14 (2003). Some commentators have argued that intellectual
property rights not only incentivize creation but also prevent harmful overuse. E.g., id. at 22228. Mark Lemley cogently refutes this argument in Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004).
193. James Gibson, Re-Reifying Data, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 163, 212 (2004).
194. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 12, at 100-04.
195. Gordon, Excuse, supra note 56, at 161. One example is using excerpts of a work to
criticize it. Id. at 157.
196. E.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in
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From this standpoint, doctrinal feedback is particularly worrisome because
(as we have already seen) it tends to be most prevalent when mere granules of
intellectual property appear in transformative works of expression. When
filmmakers, writers, and other artists avoid using some of our most meaningful
cultural referents for fear of being sued, culture suffers. The effect, like the
effect of doctrinal feedback itself, accretes incrementally and in varied contexts,
but is no less real. Its aggregate impact on creativity may defy empirical
measurement, but examples abound. A book focusing on an early twentiethcentury composer was withdrawn from circulation because less than one percent
of its content comprised the composer’s unpublished work and commentary
thereon, and the owner of the composer’s copyright disliked the book’s critical
take on its subject.197 During the filming of the dancing documentary Mad Hot
Ballroom, someone spontaneously yelled three wordsC“Everybody dance
now!”Cfrom a popular song. The filmmakers had to edit the line out, despite its
obvious appeal, because the song’s copyright owner demanded $5,000 for a
license.198 Reticence to use trademarks without a license is equally evident.
The writer and director of the hit animated film The Incredibles wanted to name
his bomb-throwing French villain “Bomb Pérignon,” but fear of a lawsuit from
champagne maker Dom Pérignon prompted a change to “Bomb Voyage.”199
Artwork depicting a Barbie doll attacked by various household appliances led
Mattel to file a trademark infringement suit, which the artist was able to win
only after four years of pro bono representation by the ACLU.200
Product placement also has a troubling effect on the creative process,
possibly because it involves payment to, rather than from, the mark user. As the
practice has become more prevalent and profitable, even its promoters have
come to fear that financial temptation will unduly influence filmmakers’
creativity.201 Of course, product placement is voluntary, so the market may
sufficiently regulate its trade-off between financing and creativity: those in the
industry who are willing to compromise creative choice to secure better
financing will do so, those who aren’t won’t, and audiences can vote with their
wallets as to which product they prefer. The problem, however, is that the
increasing prevalence of product placement and prophylactic licensing threatens
to extend trademark’s reach such that there will be no second option; those
the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks
Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-75 (1993); Lemley, supra note 88, at 1696.
197. Richard Byrne, Silent Treatment, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 16, 2004.
198. AOKI ET AL., supra note 28, at 14.
199. THE INCREDIBLES (Pixar 2004) (director’s commentary on 2005 DVD).
200. HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 1 & n.3.
201. On a scale of one to seven, where one is “strongly disagree” and seven is “strongly
agree,” members of the industry’s leading product placement group averaged a 6.04 in response
to this statement: “Placements can lead to trade-offs between the financial and creative sides of
movie making.” James Karrh et al., Practitioners’ Evolving Views on Product Placement
Effectiveness, 43 J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH 138, 145 (2003); see also Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack
Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that makers of Dom Pérignon
champagne require script approval and on-the-set monitoring of how product is presented in
James Bond movies and other films).
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filmmakers who prefer to preserve creative freedom and engage in unlicensed
use of real-world brands will not be able to do so because the law will require a
license.
Finally, regardless of whether one takes an economic or non-economic
approach to intellectual property law, expansion by accretion raises the question
of how paternalistic the law should be. One might favor an expansion of
intellectual property entitlements but still want that expansion to be driven by
top-down positivist sources rather than bottom-up licensing practices.202 The
usual argument in favor of bottom-up regimes is that they reflect social values
more directly than statutes and court rulings; with regard to fair use, for
example, community practice supposedly represents “an understanding [that]
may have been developed with an eye to the broader question” of copyright’s
goals.203 Given the amount of unnecessary licensing that takes place in the real
world of intellectual property, however, this gives the process too much credit.
It is less purposeful and more accretive than that. Licensing regimes and other
community standards are not static, and they do not spring fully formed from the
head of the god Equity. They develop and change over time, informed by legal
and social norms, in a process that does not necessarily involve any conscious
policy choice or reflect an optimal outcome. The law is thus not simply the
public’s scrivener. It should lead as well as follow, inform as well as react.
All told, then, there is reason to believe that expansion by accretion is not a
good thing. The more meaningful question, however, is not whether this
inadvertent expansion represents the best of all possible worlds, but whether its
various solutions create greater problems than they cure. The following
discussion therefore reviews the ways in which we could deal with doctrinal
feedback and discusses their collateral effects. We will see that many of the
solutions are surprisingly counterintuitive (e.g., increasing the complexity of
intellectual property statutes or encouraging more litigation), and almost all
come laden with normative implications that make them attractive only to those
with certain views. In the end, however, I propose a more normatively neutral
solution that comprises refinements in how the positive law scrutinizes licensing
information and consumer motivation without requiring any great doctrinal leap.
B. Reducing Uncertainty
If those who use trademarks and copyrighted works can more accurately
predict which uses are within the rightsholders’ control, they will agree to fewer
unneeded licenses. Clarifying the gray areas in the law is therefore one obvious
option for those interested in curtailing the accretive expansion that doctrinal
feedback produces. Of course, we may agree that clearer rules are needed, but
disagree about whether those clear rules should limit entitlements or enlarge
202. Cf. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 111, at 487 (“The real underlying issue is whether the
trademark law should act here as a creator or as a reflector of societal norms.”).
203. Weinreb, supra note 57, at 1152; accord Fisher, supra note 27, at 1680-81 & n.100;
Madison, supra note 59.
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them. That issue is for the most part outside the scope of this article. I will
point out when a particular solution inherently favors the rightsholder over the
user, or vice versa, but my overall purpose here is to identify the tools that
policymakers can use to forestall doctrinal feedback, not to prescribe what to do
with them.
1. Statutory Standards and Regulatory Rules
One obvious way to clarify intellectual property’s ambiguitiesCwhether
they originate in code or case lawCis to write more specific rules into the
governing statutes. In other words, we can rid intellectual property law of
ambiguities, and thus curtail doctrinal feedback, by moving from standards to
rules.
The rules-versus-standards debate is an old one, in intellectual property and
elsewhere. Broadly speaking, rules specify ex ante what conduct is forbidden,
with only factual determinations remaining ex post: “Do not drive over fifty-five
miles per hour.” Standards set forth a more general admonition, leaving specific
interpretation thereof for later adjudication: “Do not drive at unreasonable
speeds.”204 Standards provide less ex ante guidance, thus shifting more risk to
those who operate near their boundaries, but provide more ex post flexibility in
the individual case.205
In copyright, the doctrines that produce accretive expansionCthe
idea/expression dichotomy, the substantial similarity test, and the fair use
defenseCare all standards.206 Replacing or supplementing them with more
specific rules would help retard the accretive expansion that doctrinal feedback
produces. This would not require an abrupt change in direction; copyright has
been steadily moving from standards to rules for some time. Indeed, the history
of American copyright is essentially an evolution from a broad, industry-neutral
property right to a set of detailed, industry-specific regulations.207 For example,
the fair use standard has seen its universality and flexibility become less
important as parties who would otherwise rely heavily on the doctrineCe.g.,
libraries, archivists, and educatorsChave increasingly operated under safeharbor statutes designed specifically for them.208
Arguing for more regulatory complexity, however, goes against the weight
of copyright scholarship, which almost unanimously sees increased regulation as
a tool of rent-seeking industries pursuing a positivist expansion of
entitlements.209 While this may be true, we have now seen that a less complex
204. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
559-60 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 959 (1995).
205. Kaplow, supra note 204, at 605 (“Because individuals tend to be less well informed
concerning standards, they may bear more risk under standards than under rules . . . .”).
206. See supra Part I.A.
207. See Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87 (2004).
208. E.g., 17 U.S.C. '' 108, 110(1)-(2), 112(f).
209. E.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1637-38 (2003); Denicola, supra note 88, at 1685-86; Jessica D. Litman, Copyright,
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standards-based regime carries with it its own expansive riskCmore subtle,
perhaps, but no less threatening. In fact, expansion by accretion may be more
threatening, in that by the time it occurs it is so ingrained in industry practice
that reversing it may prove impossible. Contrary to the conventional wisdom,
then, a balkanized, industry-specific code may be a help, not a hindrance, in
halting the expansion of intellectual property rights.
For example, suppose we supplement fair use with a rule that no license is
required for any excerpt of fewer than X words, or X seconds of recorded music.
Such a rule may strike academics as simplistic to the point of idiocy, but if realworld lawyers can’t give advice to mass-market clients at levels significantly
more sophisticated than that, the current more nuanced standard is no better
(and carries with it the added potential for doctrinal feedback). On the other
hand, any bright-line rule comes with its own problems. The actual number we
use for X may be less important than the clarity the rule would provide, but the
number still matters, and would be another battleground in the war over how to
balance private incentive and public benefit. If we choose, say, the number
fifty, then Robert Frost’s poem Fire And Ice (clocking in at fifty-one words)
enjoys a protection that Ogden Nash’s The Hippopotamus (forty-six) does not.
If that seems unfair to Nash, we could change the rule so as not to apply to
works that comprise less than fifty words. Even that rule, however, fails to
recognize that the use of an entire work in an incidental manner, like a photo in
the background of a film, may be a better fair use candidate than a fragmented
but purposeful taking. We could again add caveats and variations to address
that issue, but the more adjustments we make, the more the rule comes to
resemble the indeterminate standard we were trying to replace.
These objections to bright-line rules for fair use would be less problematic if
the rules were merely safe harbors, giving clarity to those who fall within their
limits without denying others the right to fall back on the more general
standard.210 Yet safe-harbor rules (and their close cousin, industry-specific
“best practices” guidelines) have historically enjoyed mixed success at best.
Promulgated in a number of copyright contexts, such approaches often end up
compromising flexibility and adaptability without providing much clarity or
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 870-79 (1987); Liu, supra note
207, at 134-39; Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 29192 (2004); see also Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law 60-62 (Villanova Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 41,
2005) (arguing that using standards rather than rules reduces copyright’s uniformity costs). But
see Shubha Ghosh, The Merits of Ownership; Or, How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Love
Intellectual Property, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 453, 482 (2002) (arguing that “the family
resemblance between intellectual property law and tax law need not be bemoaned”).
210. See Liu, supra note 207, at 141 (noting that industry-specific regulations “do not
preclude flexibility, insofar as courts remain free to craft additional exceptions through the fair
use doctrine”); Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s
Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381 (2005) (arguing that ambiguity
inherent in fair use “standard” is preferable to more determinative fair use “rule” because fair use
must be as flexible and generally applicable to serve as counterbalance to broad, technologyneutral rights that copyright grants to authors).
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protection for users, as courts convert safe harbors into the only harbors and
make floors into ceilings and minimums into maximums.211
In contrast to copyright, trademark law has largely avoided regulatory
complexity, despite having seen its own positivist expansion in recent years.212
Using statutes to provide predictability for trademark users nevertheless presents
significant challenges. Foremost among them is that trademark’s doctrinal
feedback is based on evolving consumer perceptions. Legislation alone cannot
halt this evolution; a statute cannot simply order consumers to stop interpreting
trademark practices in an expansive way. Here, however, the same dynamic that
causes trademark’s doctrinal feedback can cure it. If consumers learn from
trademark practices that reflect expansive views of the entitlement’s reach, they
can learn from practices that reflect narrower views as well. The law can
accordingly change consumer perception by changing the legal standards and
practices that inform persuasion knowledge. For example, suppose Congress
adopts a bright-line rule that permits all unlicensed uses of branded goods in
movies. At first, such uses might result in confusion, as consumers accustomed
to seeing only licensed uses infer some connection between the mark owner and
the filmmaker. 213 But over time, as consumers encounter more and more
clearly unlicensed uses and see fewer and fewer blurred marks, they will adjust
their perception to reflect the new licensing reality.
The question remains, however, whether such bright-line trademark rules
should favor users or rightsholders. Converting trademark into a full-fledged
property right would curtail feedback by severing doctrine from its moorings in
consumer confusion. At the other extreme, eliminating dilution and sponsorship
confusion altogether and requiring proof of confusion as to origin in every case
would have much the same effect. More moderate revisions also present
normative dilemmas. A single, clear statutory definition of sponsorship
confusion would rid us of the vague hodgepodge of confusion variations
(endorsement, association, connection, etc.) and modifiers (of any kind, in some
way, etc.) that make ex ante evaluation of liability so difficult, and more
guidance regarding use of survey evidence would help as well. But what’s the
“right” definition? What’s the “correct” percentage of consumers who must be
confused before a use is considered infringing? Can the federal government
impose its answers to these questions on fifty different state trademark regimes?
And would rightsholders have too much influence over the formulation of those
answers, by virtue of their lobbying power?
In the end, then, one’s normative policy preferences regarding the proper
reach of intellectual property entitlements will largely determine one’s attitude
toward whether and how bright-line statutory amendments might limit doctrinal
feedback. Those who welcome an expansion of entitlements but who prefer a
211. See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 24, at 6-7; Kenneth D. Crews, The Law of Fair Use
and the Illusion of Fair-Use Guidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (2001).
212. See sources cited supra note 87.
213. As the Supreme Court recently held, preventing consumer confusion is not trademark’s
only priority; confusion is sometimes the price we pay to achieve other goals. KP Permanent
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22 (2004).
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top-down positivist policy over the accretive effect of licensing practice may
favor clearer statutory rules. Those who object to further expansion will be less
inclined to rely on a legislative process that has facilitated that expansion in the
past. In both cases, however, the normative battle over what the rules should
say may cause more trouble than curtailing doctrinal feedback is worth.
2. Increased Adjudication
In the foregoing discussion, the question of how best to resolve intellectual
property’s feedback-fueling ambiguities became a question of institutional
competence: can the legislature clarify the relevant standards without making
matters worse? Our inquiry is accordingly not complete without considering the
ability of other institutions to provide clarity. The most obvious alternative is
the judiciary, which has proved itself capable of industry-specific intellectual
property regulation.214 Courts are a particularly attractive option for those who
value flexible standards over bright-line rules and who view the legislative
process as an invitation to rent-seeking that produces both regulatory complexity
and poor policy results.
How might the judiciary clarify the ambiguities that cause doctrinal
feedback? Two possibilities present themselves. The first involves explicit
judicial rulemaking. In a number of instances, courts have recognized the
frustrating indeterminacy of intellectual property’s standards and have provided
bright-line clarity. To pick one copyright example, the Sixth Circuit recently
held that the ambiguous “substantial similarity” test is irrelevant in cases
involving the sampling of recorded music.215 Recognizing that “it would appear
to be cheaper to license than to litigate,” the court decided to spare samplers the
“mental, musicological, and technological gymnastics” that the vague standard
requires and instead impose a bright-line rule favoring licensing.216 And in
trademark law, the First Circuit realized that evidence of sponsorship confusion
is essentially circular, in that consumer perception both informs and is informed
by the law.217 It therefore did away with any need to show that “members of the
public will actually conclude that defendants’ product was officially sponsored”
by the plaintiff.218
Relying on judges to clarify ambiguities requires both a broad view of
judicial power and confidence in judicial policy judgments. In each of the two
foregoing cases, for example, the court arguably crossed the line from
interpretation to legislation and then reached a poor policy result.219 If curtailing
214. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 209.
215. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
216. Id. at 803.
217. Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 1989).
218. Id.
219. In Bridgeport Music, the court took a statute that makes sound recording copyrights
less extensive than other copyrights and somehow read it to make sound recording copyrights
more extensive. In Boston Athletic, the court essentially jettisoned trademark’s consumer
confusion standard altogether, a holding with no basis in statute or common law.
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doctrinal feedback is important enough, perhaps this is the price we pay. If not,
however, we may want to consider a second way in which courts can help
clarify ambiguities. Recall that risk aversion and other pro-licensing influences
in key industries mean that relatively few disputes over the reach of copyright
and trademark entitlements ever make it to court. Indeed, even in the absence of
risk aversion, disputants have a suboptimal incentive to litigate a rights-defining
issue because they bear nearly all the costs of litigation but do not fully
internalize the benefits; third parties gain valuable knowledge from reading the
opinion and observing how the case was resolved, without contributing a dime
toward litigation expenses.220 Combine this lack of litigation with the ambiguity
of the doctrines that apply when a case actually is litigated and you have a
remarkable dearth of helpful precedent on which copyright and trademark users
can rely.
Courts therefore do not have to replace a vague standard with a bright-line
rule in order to help curtail doctrinal feedback; rather, every ruling that applies
the standard helps clarify it. This suggests that we should encourage more
frequent rulings on the reach of intellectual property entitlements. That’s right:
we need more lawsuits. Allowing prevailing defendants to recover litigation
costs from rightsholding plaintiffs might helpCalthough if prevailing
rightsholders can recover them too, users are not going to be much more likely
to risk litigation than they are now.221 Public interest groups that now merely
give advice to copyright and trademark users might focus their resources instead
on litigating disputes.222 A federal small-claims court focusing on intellectual
property could be empowered to issue substantive rulings.223 Or a government
220. If an issue is sufficiently important, those with an interest will not be content to sit idle
and reap informational benefits but will band together to champion their preferred outcome.
Public choice theory tells us that this is particularly true for highly organized communities or
industries dominated by a few players because they are better positioned to internalize all of
litigation’s benefits. (The recording and movie industries’ unanimity in the file-sharing wars
comes to mind, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764
(2005), as does the prevalence of amicus briefs in groundbreaking cases.) But more often
organizational costs will be too high or the issues too unexceptional. Some scholars have offered
solutions to this dilemma in the patent realm. E.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges,
Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office
Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004);
Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents,
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004); Carl Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis
and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017 (2004).
221. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (“[D]efendants who seek to
advance a variety of meritorious copyright defenses should be encouraged to litigate them to the
same extent that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.”).
222. See Elaine Dutka, No Free Samples for Documentaries., N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006,
' 2, at 16 (discussing coalition of lawyers that donate fair-use advice to filmmakers); Fair Use
Network, http://www.fairusenetwork.org (providing free advice on uses of intellectual property);
cf. Anick Jesdanun, EFF Prefers Litigation to Legislation, SALON, July 4,2006,
http://www.salon.com/wire/ap/D8ILDUDO0.html.
223. See Remedies for Small Copyright Claims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet, and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 29, 2006 (transcript
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju26767.000/hju26767_0f.htm);

Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion

48

agency might be authorized to issue opinions on particular disputes, in the style
of SEC no-action letters or IRS advisories224Can attractive option when one
considers that more litigation alone will do little good if cases settle or are
resolved on procedural grounds.
Of course, each of these mechanisms
comes heavily laden with normative baggage. Public interest litigation, for
example, is likely to promote pro-user policies, whereas recent Congressional
interest in a small-claims court seems rooted in concern for copyright owners.225
Less apparent, but more important, is that an increase in the number of cases
litigated will have an expansive effect. Courts are so diffuse and so rarely
unanimous on gray-area issues that they almost invariably send mixed signals to
the marketplace. (In trademark, the problem is particularly acute, because both
federal and state law govern the reach of entitlements.) Therefore, unless the
Supreme Court weighs in, potential licensees with an eye on the national market
will look to the most conservative rulings, regardless of their source and
regardless of whether they articulate new bright-line rules or merely apply
existing standards. This means that the judiciary’s fitness for reducing overall
indeterminacy is largely in the eye of the beholder: those who favor expansive
entitlements will embrace judicial clarification, and those who don’t won’t.
As promised, then, one’s normative views on the reach of intellectual
property entitlements will largely determine one’s preferred method for
clarifying copyright and trademark ambiguities, regardless of whether one
chooses a statutory or adjudicative solution. Curing indeterminacy comes
heavily laden with normative difficulties. In the next section, we will see that
the same holds true when we attempt to curtail doctrinal feedback not by
clarifying ambiguities, but by reducing the severity of the consequences that
infringing parties face.
C. Reducing Consequences
Uncertainty regarding the reach of intellectual property entitlements is only
one of the factors that give rise to unneeded licensing. An equally important
factor is the penalty for infringement. Even in the face of considerable
uncertainty, a risk-averse user would not hesitate to proceed unlicensed if a
finding of infringement simply meant the payment of a fair-market licensing fee.
In reality, however, the consequences are much more severe. Remedies in
copyright cases include not only actual damages, but also statutory damages of
up to $150,000 per work infringed, disgorgement of profits, and attorney’s
fees.226 Trademark defendants face similar consequences.227 Making
supracompensatory damages unavailable or reducing their severity would
Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, A Quick and Inexpensive System for Resolving Peer-toPeer Copyright Disputes, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (2005).
224. For this point I’m indebted to Mike Carroll and Shari Motro, each of whom
independently suggested it.
225. See Remedies for Small Copyright Claims, supra note 223.
226. See sources cited supra note 18.
227. See sources cited supra notes 112-113.
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therefore decrease the likelihood that intellectual property users would secure an
unneeded license, and would accordingly reduce doctrinal feedback even when
entitlements remain indeterminate.
To some extent, copyright and trademark law already remove the threat of
excessive money damages in cases of innocent infringement.228 The real
sticking point, however, is not monetary remedies but injunctions, which can
bring high-cost projects to a screeching halt when a rightsholder whose
intellectual property appears in the work, however briefly, secures an order
against its release. This presents a classic holdout problem, as the rightsholder
demands payment greatly in excess of the value that its intellectual property
represents to the new project. If the rightsholder could demand only a
compensatory licensing fee, its ability to hijack the defendant’s entire
production process would disappear. Using some form of liability rule to
govern copyright and trademark entitlements would therefore go a long way
toward curtailing the unnecessary licensing that fuels doctrinal feedback.229
Although of more recent vintage than the rules-versus-standards battle, the
property-rule-versus-liability-rule debate has been going on for some time in
intellectual property scholarship.230 Recently the Supreme Court entered the
debate as well; in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,231 the Court rejected any
presumption favoring injunctions in patent cases and suggested in dicta that
such favoritism is also unwarranted in copyright.232 This newfound judicial
sensitivity to the effect of injunctions suggests that mitigating the consequences
of infringement is a politically realistic way to curtail accretive expansion.
One obvious place to start is with preliminary injunctions. Courts have
traditionally found such injunctions appropriate “in the vast majority of cases”
228. E.g., 15 U.S.C. ' 1114(2) (trademark); 17 U.S.C. '' 405(b), 504(c)(2) (copyright).
229. The terms “liability rule” and “property rule” come from Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). “Whenever someone may destroy the initial
entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is
protected by a liability rule.” Id. at 1092. “An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the
extent that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him
in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.” Id.
230. E.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 73-74 (1966); Ralph
Brown, Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property Invasions: Themes and Variations, 55 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 47-48 (1992); Gordon, Excuse, supra note 56, at 188-92; Alex Kozinski &
Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 513
(1999); Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1132-34 (1990).
231. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). Even before MercExchange, the Court had hinted that lower
courts should consider judge-made licenses. See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483,
505 (2001); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994); Dun v.
Lumbermen’s Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1908). But see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (“Congress has not designed, and we see no warrant
for judicially imposing, a ‘compulsory license’ permitting unfettered access to the unpublished
copyrighted expression of public figures.”).
232. 126 S. Ct. at 1840-41. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy specifically cited the
holdout problems that arise when injunctions give rightsholders “undue leverage in
negotiations”Cparticularly if the entitlement covers “but a small component of the product the
[defendants] seek to produce.” Id. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion

50

and issue them even absent proof of irreparable harm, as long as the rightsholder
demonstrates a likelihood of success on the merits.233 Yet preliminary
injunctions are particularly pernicious because they tend to stop defendants in
their tracks and bring them to the bargaining tableCthus both creating an early
opportunity for holdout and keeping cases from reaching a substantive ruling
that might clarify feedback-fueling gray areas.234 If we removed the categorical
presumptions in favor of such injunctions, as MercExchange implies should be
done, intellectual property users would be less likely to engage in gray-area
licensing and more likely to risk litigation.
Even if preliminary injunctions were rarer, however, the specter of
permanent injunctions and supracompensatory damages would cause many
intellectual property users to embrace unneeded licenses. The scholarship has
produced a number of liability-rule proposals that would mitigate this
tendency.235 Yet whether such a rule is an attractive solution to doctrinal
feedback depends on one’s normative views on other important intellectual
property questions.
For example, a liability rule might produce an increase in litigation over the
reach of copyright and trademark entitlements: as the threat of injunction
disappears, users become less risk averse and more willing to roll the liability
dice. If so, this would curtail doctrinal feedback in two ways. First, it would
create more opportunities for courts to issue substantive rulings, which would
clarify the legal ambiguities that cause unneeded licensing. Second, it would
mean that positive law, in the form of judicial decisions, would play a greater
role in the valuation of entitlements, displacing the private licensing that fuels
doctrinal feedback. Therefore, those who trust courts more than legislatures or
markets when it comes to entitlement valuation might prefer this outcomeCan
obvious point, common to any liability rule. Less obvious is that court-imposed
licensing would likely have its own expansive effect, because once courts no
longer confront the all-or-nothing choice that a property rule imposes, they will
be more inclined to “split the baby” and order moderate licensing fees in cases
that the defendant would once have won outright. Any such expansion would
be positivist, not accretive, but would still trouble those who oppose any growth
in entitlements.
Another possibility is that a liability rule would actually increase the
incidence of private licensing; parties sometimes transact more efficiently in the

233. Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 62, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (copyright
case); see also Int’l Kennel Club of Chicago, Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846 F.2d 1079, 1084 (7th
Cir. 1988) (trademark); Standard & Poor’s Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704,
708 (2d Cir. 1982) (trademark).
234. Brown, supra note 230, at 47.
235. For example, when holdout is especially threatening (such as when the use is
transformative), several commentators have suggested an accounting of profits as the sole
copyright remedy. Gordon, Render, supra note 56, at 91; Kozinski & Newman, supra note 230,
at 526; Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE
L.J. 1, 55-58 (2002); John Tehranian, Whither Copyright? Transformative Use, Free Speech,
and an Intermediate Liability Proposal, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1201, 1239-40.
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shadow of liability rules, not less.236 Getting rid of injunctions might make
rightsholders more willing to offer attractive licensing terms rather than confront
the uncertainty of court-ordered royalties.237 If so, those who already engage in
prophylactic licensing might continue to do so, happy to pay less than they do
now. Those who cannot currently afford to license, and who must instead alter
or abandon their projects, might see licensing fees become more affordable.
Courts would still look to these licenses when determining whether a given use
is fair, and consumers would still infer sponsorship vel non from the trademark
practices they encounter.
Whether this outcome is attractive depends on how accurately the new and
improved licensing market correlates with overall social welfare. The market
would certainly be more representative of true arms-length bargains between
equals. But holdout and risk aversion are only some of the inefficiencies that
intellectual property confronts. Another is positive externalities: the kinds of
works at the core of the feedback problemCmovies, music, etc.Cproduce broad
social benefits that neither party internalizes and that are accordingly not
captured even in more efficient bargaining.238 Those who consider these
externalities significant will therefore approve of a liability-rule regime only if it
discounts monetary damages to account for these hidden values (e.g., by
expressly allowing for wholly uncompensated uses of copyrights and
trademarks).239 If courts instead take a one-size-fits-all approachCcharging a
penurious documentarian the same fee as a major movie studio just because they
both use the same materialCthen the game may not be worth the candle.
What this all tells us is that no matter what the effect of a liability
ruleCmore litigation, more licensing, or bothCits appeal depends on one’s
normative views on other topics, just as we saw with previous solutions to
doctrinal feedback, and the appeal will be greatest to those who favor expansion
or discount externalities. The search for a more normatively neutral solution
continues.
D. Doctrinal Refinements
We have now seen that clarifying legal ambiguities and reducing the
consequences of infringement can go a long way toward curtailing doctrinal
feedback. Both approaches, however, carry costs that may be unacceptably
high, depending on one’s normative views on other important intellectual
property issues. Moreover, both focus on reducing risk and thus would have no
effect on the symbiotic licensing markets that can also fuel the feedback loop.
This final section will therefore discuss how changes in copyright and trademark
that do not address risk aversion can nevertheless help address the feedback
problem, and do so in a more normatively neutral way.
236. See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW 142-65 (2005).
237. See Kozinski & Newman, supra note 230, at 527.
238. See Gordon, Excuse, supra note 56, at 176-77; Loren, supra note 64, at 6; Africa,
supra note 26, at 1166.
239. E.g., Gordon, Render, supra note 56, at 90 & n.59.
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The most obvious candidates for revision are those doctrines that refer to
licensing markets: the “market effect” factor in copyright’s fair use defense and
trademark’s “consumer confusion” cynosure. As already discussed, however,
these doctrines enjoy widespread acceptance, and for good reason. Rather than
discarding them entirely, then, we should explore ways of making them more
attentive to the danger of doctrinal feedback. We want intellectual property
entitlements to be market-referential without being market-reverential.
Here we can take a cue from patent law, which manages to refer to licensing
markets without producing accretive expansion. Part of the reason that patent
law is able to pull this off is that its case law explicitly infuses courts with a
healthy skepticism towards the significance of licensing evidence.240 The cases
reveal a longstanding practice of discounting licensing information when the
fees are suspiciously low, the licensing agreement gives the licensee things of
value besides than the patented technology, or the rightsholder’s market
penetration is unproven.241 Patent courts know that such licensing often
indicates not tacit acceptance of a patent’s validity, but a starkly practical
cost/benefit judgment that it is better to license than litigate.
The lesson for copyright is clear. If fair use jurisprudence were to focus not
just on whether a licensing market exists, but on why a licensing market exists,
its reliance on private transactions as a proxy for public welfare would make
more sense. When licenses are the result of uncertainty as to how far the right
extends and fear that an expensive project could be held up because of one
small component, the licenses are not particularly meaningful and other fair use
factors should carry more weight. In contrast, when liability is clear and the
user adds little value (as when an entire work is taken and used in a nontransformative way), licensing markets should play an important role in the
analysis. This jurisprudential change requires no great doctrinal leap; courts
already recognize that a single defendant’s request for a license is irrelevant
when the request goes unfulfilled and the defendant subsequently invokes fair
use.242 All that remains is for courts (or Congress) to extrapolate beyond the
individual defendant’s case and realize that even when an entire community
habitually seeks licenses, the resulting market is not always the best measure of
240. See sources cited supra note 187.
241. E.g., John E. Thropp’s Sons’ Co. v. Seiberling, 264 U.S. 320, 330 (1924); Rockwell
Int’l Corp. v. U.S., 37 Fed. Cl. 478, 501 (1997); EWP Corp. v. Reliance Universal Inc., 755 F.2d
898, 907-08 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir.
1983); Kleinman v. Kobler, 230 F.2d 913, 914 (2d Cir. 1956); N. Elec. Co. v. U.S., 386 F.2d
845, 849 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see also Merges, supra note 186, at 829 (“Where a licensee has other
motivationsCespecially a desire to avoid litigation, or a need to license a package of technology
including the patent at issueClicenses have not been as effective in establishing patentability.”);
Eric von Hippel, Appropriability of Innovation Benefit as a Predictor of the Source of
Innovation, 11 RES. POL’Y 95, 102 n.9 (1982) (concluding that ambiguity as to validity and reach
of patent rights results in licensing fees determined “at least as much by the contenders’ relative
willingness to pay to avoid the expense and bother of a court fight as it is by the merits of the
particular case”).
242. E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 n.18 (1994); Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 2006).
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the entitlement’s optimal reach.243
Patent’s approach might not work as well for trademark law. There are
some parallels: if courts engaged in a more penetrating inquiry into trademark
licensing, they would undoubtedly discover that users often secure licenses to
avoid any risk of litigation or because they receive something other than
immunity from liability (e.g., product placement financing), rather than because
the law favors the rightsholder. But except in its most expansive property-right
incarnation, trademark law focuses not on the rightsholder’s interests, but on
consumer perception. And if consumers expect a given use to be licensed, the
motivation for the licensing practices that formed that expectation seems
normatively irrelevant. Confusion is confusion, and demands a remedy. For the
same reason, the liability rules discussed above are poor solutions to trademark
feedback. A liability rule would not remedy confusion; it would merely
compensate the mark owner for confusion’s effects.
Yet if we focus on motivation of a different sort, we can escape this
conundrum. Instead of inquiring into licensing motivation, courts could inquire
into consumer motivation: does the confusion actually make a difference to
consumers? In the classic “passing off” trademark case, we can safely presume
that confusion is material because marks are one of consumers’ primary means
of distinguishing between products. But in cases involving sponsorship,
approval, and especially permission, the mark’s materiality to the purchasing
decision is less apparent. No one watches the Olympics simply because Xerox
happens to be the sponsor. And chances are that few people select the movies
they see or television programs they watch based on what products appear in
them, even if they assume that the appearances are licensed.244 Mark owners
should therefore have to show not only that unlicensed uses are confusing, but
also that that confusion is material to consumers’ economic choices.245
As with copyright, this doctrinal revision works no great change in the law.
Several of the narrower merchandising cases rested their holdings on the
proposition that consumers didn’t care whether the merchandise they purchased
was “official,” even if they were confused as to whether it was.246 And in a
243. Three court opinions have already flirted with this approach, although two (from the
same case) lack precedential value. See Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448
F.3d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that copyright owner cannot prevent transformative
fair use through strategic licensing or by pointing to certain users’ willingness to license);
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1397 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (“If the publishers have no right to the fee in many of the instances
in which they are collecting it, we should not validate that practice by now using the income
derived from it to justify further imposition of fees.”); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document
Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778, 1996 WL 54741, at *11 (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (dismissing evidence
of lost “permission fees” because “[t]he right to permission fees is precisely what is at issue
here”), vacated, 74 F.3d 1512 (6th Cir. 1996).
244. See Lemley, supra note 88, at 1707 (recognizing distinction between consumers who
are not confused “about the relationship between the two products, but nonetheless believe that
the defendant might have needed a license to use the mark”); accord Dogan & Lemley, supra
note 111, at 486 n.101.
245. See Lunney, supra note 88, at 397-98.
246. Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg and Co., 633 F.2d 912, 918 (9th Cir.

Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion

54

recent case challenging the unlicensed use of a mark in a movie, the mark owner
failed to secure a preliminary injunction partly because the court didn’t believe
that the appearance of the mark would influence the public’s desire to see the
film.247 Requiring mark owners to prove this additional element will obviously
make proving infringement harder, but courts and Congress remain free to
oversee an enlargement of trademark entitlements through dilution theory and
the continued viability of broad sponsorship confusion liability.
In the end, then, encouraging a more penetrating inquiry into the
motivations of copyright licensees and confused consumers may be the least
normatively intrusive way to curtail doctrinal feedback and the accretive
expansion it causes. No change in the law is entirely normatively neutral, of
course, and all the solutions we have considered obviously share the normative
judgment that accretive expansion is a problem. But the other alternatives,
although effective, have more serious normative consequences. That said, those
who do not fear or mind rent-seeking may prefer the adoption of statutes
featuring industry-specific, bright-line rules. Those for whom expansion of
intellectual property rights is less of a problem than ambiguous standards may
favor encouraging more litigation. Those who believe that holdout and risk
aversion are all that stand in the way of optimal allocation of intellectual
property entitlements might want to promote bargaining in the shadow of
liability rules. In all these cases, the positive law becomes a more active steward
of intellectual property policy.
CONCLUSION
Doctrinal feedback subtly rigs the intellectual property game in favor of
rightsholders. In copyright, it is pronounced, pernicious, and pervasive, causing
an accretive expansion largely unnoticed in positive law and unappreciated in
the scholarship. In trademark, it is more attenuated and limited in effect, but
nevertheless threatens to extend rightsholder control in surprising and
worrisome ways. In patent, it is muted and causes no systemic growth in
entitlements.248
1980); Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp.
167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 566 F. Supp.
711, 720-21 (W.D. Pa. 1983). But see Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 332
(2d Cir. 1983) (discounting evidence that consumers did not care about perceived association
between defendant’s product and mark owner).
247. Caterpillar Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (C.D. Ill. 2003).
248. Although it is outside the scope of this article, I should point out the feedback potential
in other areas of the law, particularly those whose doctrines incorporate that famous legal fiction
and invitation to circularity, “reasonableness.” Examples include eminent domain’s “reasonable,
investment-backed expectations,” see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]f the owner’s reasonable expectations are shaped by what
courts allow as a proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what the
courts say it is.”), the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonable expectations of privacy,” see United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our expectations, and the risks we
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the
past and present.”), and tort law’s “reasonable person”Ca standard that may cause risk-averse
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No matter what one’s view on the propriety of expanded intellectual
property rights, the feedback effect is problematic. Yet when it comes to
crafting a solution, one’s views matter a great deal, because the most obvious
cures come laden with normative baggage. One solution, however, promises to
remain (mostly) normatively neutral and requires no great doctrinal leap: subtle
refinements in how the positive law scrutinizes licensing information and
consumer motivation.
In the end, there is no panacea for the phenomenon of doctrinal feedback,
but we can start by promoting awareness of the ways in which risk aversion and
other pro-licensing factors distort the informational content of the markets on
which the law relies. Such awareness will do nothing to halt the positivist
expansion that troubles so many intellectual property observers, but it will help
ensure that any expansion in the reach of intellectual property entitlements is the
result of conscious policy choice and democratic process, not inadvertent
accretion.

manufacturers to use product warnings that at first appear absurd but whose ubiquity eventually
causes the public to lower its own estimation of reasonableness, cf. Jane Easter Bahls, Better Safe
. . . , ENTREPRENEUR, July 2003, at 76 (“CAUTION! Do NOT swallow nails! May cause
irritation!”). In broad sense, we can even view our democratic system of government as a
feedback mechanism, as past policies shape the norms that voters and those they elect use to
decide what to do going forward.

